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STATEMENT OP JURISDICTION
This court has jurisdiction of this matter pursuant to Utah
Code Ann. § 35-1-86.

ISSUES PRESENTED AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW
1.

Was the Industrial Commission correct in relying on the

lent-employee doctrine in resolving this matter, when the
Respondent Mark Bundy submitted arguments on each element of that
doctrine in his motion for review, and when the Industrial
Commission is authorized to review and decide its cases without
deference to the decision of the Administrative Law Judge.
2.

Did the Industrial Commission correctly apply the lent-

employee doctrine in finding that, because the decedent was
performing the work of Petitioner BB&B Trucking, and was subject
to its direction and control, BB&B Trucking was the sole employer
of decedent and therefore solely liable for workers compensation
death benefits.
The standard of review for both issues is correction of
error.

Uintah Oil Assoc, v. County Bd. of Equalization. 853 P.2d

894, 896 (Utah 1993).
As to the issue or issues regarding Utah Code Ann.
§ 35-1-107 and the Uninsured Employers Fund, Mr. Bundy
incorporates by reference those portions of the Uninsured
Employers Fund's brief, which deal with the appropriate
- 1 -

interpretation of that statute and are not inconsistent with this
brief.

DETERMINATIVE STATUTES AND RULES
The following statutes are referred to herein.
Utah Code Ann. § 35-1-42 (Complete text is located at
addendum 4 attached hereto).
Utah Code Ann. § 35-1-86:
The Court of Appeals has
jurisdiction to review, reverse, or
annul any order of the commission,
or to suspend or delay the
operation or execution of any
order.
Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-12 (Complete text is located at
addendum 5 attached hereto.)
Utah Code Ann. § 35-1-107 (Complete text is located at
addendum 6 attached hereto.)

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
1.

Nature of the Case.
This is a petition for review of an order of the

Industrial Commission of Utah.

The Industrial Commission awarded

death benefits to the minor heirs of Robert T. Phillipson. Mr.
Phillipson was killed as the result of an accident arising out of
and in the course of his employment.

(R. 224-235, Findings of

Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Order, attached hereto as Addendum
1; R. 275-281, Order Granting Motion for Review, attached hereto
- 2 -

as Addendum 2.) The award of benefits is not contested in the
petition for review.

However, Petitioners BB&B Transportation

("BB&B") and Workers Compensation Fund of Utah ("WCFU") complain
that they should not be held liable for the full benefit amount.
The minor heirs to Mr. Phillipson are not parties to the petition
for review.
2.

Course of Proceedings.
Mr. Phillipson was injured on May 10, 1991 in a motor

vehicle accident.

The injuries resulted in his death.

At the

time of the accident Mr. Phillipson was driving a truck owned by
Respondent Mark Bundy and leased to petitioner BB&B.

The spouse

and minor heirs of Mr. Phillipson filed a claim for death
benefits on August 3, 1992. (R.4).

The spouse's claim was

dismissed because it had been filed beyond the one year statute
of limitation period.

However, the administrative law judge

ruled that the statute of limitations was tolled as to the minor
heirs.

(R.47).

That ruling is not contested by the parties.

A formal adjudicative hearing was held April 22, 1993. The
Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order were entered
May 6, 1993. (R. 244-235; Addendum 2 attached hereto.) The
administrative law judge held that Mr. Phillipson was an employee
of both BB&B and Mr. Bundy at the time of his death, and that
therefore both employers were jointly and severally liable for
the payment of death benefits.

The WCFU, BB&B's workers

- 3-

compensation insurer, was directed to pay the benefits subject to
being reimbursed 50% from Mr. Bundy.

If Mr. Bundy is insolvent

or unable to pay the 50%, then the Uninsured Employer's Fund
("UEF") will be responsible to pay the 50% to WCFU.
Motions for review were filed by both UEF and Mr. Bundy.
The UEF filed its motion on June 1, 1993.
Bundy filed his motion on June 7, 1993.

(R. 269-274).
(R. 237-263).

Mr.
BB&B and

WCFU filed a responsive memorandum supporting the reasoning of
the administrative law judge.

(R. 264-268).

The Industrial Commission issued its Order Granting Motion
for Review on March 22, 1994.

(R. 275-282).

The Industrial

Commission adopted the Findings of Fact contained in the
administrative law judge's order, and made the additional finding
that "Phillipson was performing the work of BB&B on the date of
his fatal industrial accident."

(R. 275). The Industrial

Commission then concluded that Mr. Phillipson was a loaned
employee solely in the service of BB&B at the time of the fatal
industrial accident, and that consequently Mr. Bundy and UEF are
not liable to participate in the payment of death benefits with
WCFU.

(R. 278).

STATEMENT OF FACTS
The facts indicate clearly that at the time of the accident,
Mr. Phillipson was in the employ of BB&B only.
- 4 -

Mr. Phillipson

had been dispatched by BB&B to make the trip he was on when the
accident occurred.

(R. 105, 408). At the time of his fatal

injury, Mr. Phillipson was performing the work of BB&B.
(R.275).
BB&B.

This fact is not disputed by the Petitioners WCFU or

(Petitionees Brief at 6.)

Mr. Phillipson was driving Mr.

Bundy's truck which had been leased to BB&B.
Ex.E-1).

(R. 104; R. 109,

The lease agreement had been drafted by BB&B, (R. 407),

and provided that BB&B would procure and maintain in force a
policy of workers compensation insurance.

(Lease Agreement,

J[ 10A; R. 329-340; Addendum 3 attached hereto).

It also provided

the following:
1*

That the leased truck was engaged exclusively in the

service of BB&B, and all transports performed with the truck were
under the "direction of and under exclusive control and
supervision of the Lessee [BB&B]."

(Lease Agreement, f 2, R.

329-340; Addendum 3 attached hereto.)
2.

That Mr. Bundy would locate drivers, but that "Lessee

[BB&B] shall have the complete care, custody and control of both
the Leased Equipment and drivers furnished therewith," with
certain exceptions stated.

(Lease Agreement f 3; R. 329-340;

Addendum 3 attached hereto).
3*

That Mr. Bundy, pursuant to the exceptions referred to

in the preceding paragraph, had purported responsibility for
"hiring, setting the wages, hours and working conditions of and
- 5 -

adjusting the grievances of, supervision, training, disciplining
and firing of all drivers . . . "

(Lease Agreement f 3A; R. 329-

340; Addendum 3 attached hereto).

However, the lease gave BB&B

absolute veto authority over the selection and use of drivers,
providing that Mr. Bundy "shall furnish to [BB&B] a list of [Mr.
Bundy's] qualified drivers and any supporting documentation
relating thereto that [BB&B] may, from time to time, reasonably
request.

[BB&B] is hereby granted the right to request [Mr.

Bundy] not to use any particular driver, and upon such request
from [BB&B], [Mr. Bundy] shall comply therewith"

(Lease

Agreement f 4F; R. 329-340; Addendum 3 attached hereto).
4.

That BB&B retained the exclusive right to dispatch the

driver, make job assignments and to require detailed reports of
each trip.

(Lease Agreement,flfl3, 6; R. 329-340; Addendum 3

attached hereto).
5.

That BB&B would procure and maintain in force policies

of insurance policies and insurance covering personal injury and
"Workmen's Compensation Insurance."

(Lease Agreement, 5 10A; R.

329-340; Addendum 3 attached hereto).
6.

That all loads hauled by Mr. Phillipson had to be

approved by BB&B and that Mr. Phillipson must call BB&B to check
in before 10:00 a.m. Mountain Time, Monday through Friday, (Lease
Agreement f 11(b); R. 329-340; Addendum 3 attached hereto).

- 6 -

Mr. Bundy testified that while he had located Mr.
Phillipson, BB&B had the right of control to exercise power over
his decisions, and that in reality Mr. Bundy had merely the
initial responsibility to provide a driver.

(R. 388, 393). Mr.

Bundy also testified that BB&B, pursuant to the lease, had the
right to veto his choice of any driver selected for the leased
vehicle.

(R. 394). He also testified that BB&B had agreed in

the lease to provide workers compensation insurance for the
drivers of his truck. (R. 396).
BB&B did in fact assign Mr. Phillipson and its other drivers
regarding pick ups, deliveries, transports and dispatches.
(R. 408). On each of Mr. Phillipson's trips, he was required to
report in to BB&B on a very regular basis concerning his
whereabouts at all times.

(R. 230, Findings of Fact, Conclusions

of Law and Order, Addendum 1 attached hereto; R. 365, 367, 375).
Mr. Phillipson was not required to report in with Mr. Bundy,
nor did Mr. Bundy have any control over dispatching of Mr.
Phillipson or his travel routes.

(R. 376).

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The Industrial Commission appropriately utilized the lentemployee doctrine in resolving this matter.

Contrary to the

arguments of Petitioners, WCFU and BB&B, the lent-employee
doctrine was argued in Respondent Mark Bundy1 motion for review
- 7 -

to the Industrial Commission.

Each element of the lent-employee

doctrine was addressed within the motion.

The motion centered

around the fact that Mr. Phillipson was under the direction of
BB&B and was obligated to perform the work pursuant to BB&Bfs
instruction.

Mr. Phillipson and BB&B both consented to the

relationship through their practices.

The work Mr. Phillipson

performed at the time of his death was that of BB&B.

Finally,

BB&B retained the right to control the details of Mr.
Phillipson1s work performance.
in the motion for review.

Each of these elements was argued

The elements and the intended result

of Mr. Bundy's motion for review to the Industrial Commission are
the very substance of the lent-employee doctrine.

To reject the

Industrial Commission's consideration of this argument would
entail excessive reliance on legal formalism over substance.
Assuming for the sake of argument that the parties had not
raised the elements or effect of the lent-employee doctrine
before the Industrial Commission, that fact does not prohibit the
Industrial Commission from basing its decision on grounds not
raised by the administrative law judge or the parties. The
Industrial Commission is not an appellate level review.

It acts

as fact finder and applies the law that is appropriate for the
just resolution of each case. Moreover, Petitioners1 cite no
authority for their contention that the Industrial Commission may

- 8 -

not rely on theories not raised by the parties.

Therefore, the

Industrial Commission was correct in its application of the law.
Under the lent-employee doctrine, the Industrial Commission
correctly found that BB&B was Phillipson's sole employer.

The

elements of the lent-employee doctrine involve a three part test.
These elements consider the existence of an express or implied
contract of hire between the employee and the special employer,
whether the work being done is that of the special employer, and
whether the special employer has the right to control the details
of the work.

When these conditions apply to both employers, the

employers are jointly liable.

However, when these conditions

apply to only one employer, that employer is solely liable.
Mark Bundy yielded complete control and custody of the truck
and Mr. Phillipson as its driver to BB&B pursuant to the lease
agreement drafted by BB&B.

The work being done at the time of

the accident was solely that of BB&B, as found by the Industrial
Commission.

Mr. Phillipson had an implied contract with BB&B

through his acceptance of the terms under which he drove for them
over a period of many months. As a result, BB&B was the sole
employer of Mr. Phillipson and was appropriately held solely
liable for the workers compensation benefits.

The fact that

Petitioners admitted to BB&B being the statutory employer at the
beginning of the hearing in this matter is not an exclusive
determination preventing BB&B from also being found as the sole
- 9 -

employer.

The decision of the Industrial Commission holding

Petitioner as solely fully liable for the death benefits in this
case should be affirmed.

ARGUMENT
I.

THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION PROPERLY RELIED ON THE LENTEMPLOYEE DOCTRINE IN RESOLVING THIS ACTION.
Petitioners WCFU and BB&B argue that the Industrial

Commission erred in applying the lent-employee doctrine because
it allegedly had not been raised by any of the parties. However,
the lent-employee doctrine was not a new doctrine conceived by
the Industrial Commission but was argued in Respondent Mark
Bundyfs motion for review to the Industrial Commission.
Moreover, even it if was a legal theory not argued by the
parties, which Mr. Bundy disputes, the Industrial Commission is
empowered by statute and by decisions of the Utah Supreme Court
to take such action in arriving at the correct resolution of this
case.
A.

THE LENT-EMPLOYEE DOCTRINE WAS NOT A NEW THEORY CONCEIVED
SOLELY BY THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION, BUT WAS ARGUED IN
RESPONDENT'S MOTION FOR REVIEW.
The lent-employee doctrine was not newly raised by the

Industrial Commission.

Each element of the doctrine was argued

extensively by Mr. Bundy in his Motion for Review to the
Industrial Commission.

Petitioners cite Arthur Larson, Workmenfs
- 10 -

Compensation Law, Vol. IB, p. 8-434 (1993), for the requisite
elements to invoke the lent employee doctrine:
§ 48.00. When a general employer lends an
employee to a special employer, the special
employer becomes responsible for workmen's
compensation only if:
(a) the employee has made a contract of hire,
express or implied with the special employer;
(b) the work being done is essentially that
of the special employer; and
(c) the special employer has the right to
control the details of the work.

Each of these elements was argued by Mr. Bundy in his Motion
for Review.

Specifically, Point Two of the Motion for Review,

entitled "BB&B Transportation was the Decedent's Sole Employer,"
argues each element of the lent employee doctrine.
Motion states that "BB&B dispatched the decedent.

First, the
It had the

sole right to approve or disapprove of his use . . . .

The

decedent was required to file detailed trip reports with BB&B."
(R. 245). This description of the business arrangement infers an
implied contract based on mutual consent.

See Eaddy v. A.J.

Metier Hauling & Rigging Co., 325 S.E.2d 581, 284 S.C. 270
(S.C.App. 1985).

The court there stated that "the first part of

the [lent employee] test is satisfied if the lent employee
consents to the special employment relationship . . .."
583.

Id at

The court also held that consent can be inferred from
- 11 -

acceptance of control.

Clearly these factors were argued in

depth by Mr. Bundy in his motion for review to the Industrial
Commission.

Second, the Motion states that "BB&B had the

exclusive right of control over the decedent's employment
activities."

(R. 245). Third, the Motion states that "[t]he

decedent was required to file detailed trip reports with BB&B . .
. BB&B required the drivers to call in to BB&B's offices daily
while under a dispatch . . . Decedent was under the regular
control of BB&B in BB&B's course of business."

(R. 246).

By

arguing these several points, Mr. Bundy set forth the elements of
the lent employee doctrine.

Mr. Bundy may not have referred to

the name of the legal doctrine as the "lent employee doctrine,"
but he expressly referred to and argued the effects of the Lease
Agreement and the rights granted thereunder.

(R. 246).

It is evident that the argument asserted in Point Two of Mr.
Bundyfs Motion for Review is one concerning the decedent's
employment status, and that such argument is directed toward
demonstrating that decedent was a lent employee under the
exclusive employ of BB&B.

The elements and the intended result

of Mr. Bundy's Motion are the substance of the lent-employee
doctrine.

To reject the Industrial Commission's consideration of

this argument for the reason that Mr. Bundy failed to state the
formal name of the legal doctrine, as Petitioners demand, would
entail excessive reliance on legal formalism and abstraction.
- 12 -

See Mullanev v. Wilbur, 421 U.S. 684, 698-99 and n.25, 95 S.Ct.
1881, 1889-1890 and n.25 (1979) (cited favorably in State v.
Sorenson, 758 P.2d 466 (Utah App. 1988)) (stating that rules
regarding burden of proof are more "concerned with substance
rather than . . . formalism"); Cannefax v. Clement, 786 P.2d
1377, 1390 (Utah App. 1990), afffd 818 P.2d 546 (Utah 1991)
(Bullock, J., dissenting) (denouncing formalistic interpretation
of contract language as "a glorification of abstraction for
abstraction's sake").
Mr. Bundy's intention in bringing his Motion for Review was
to convince the Industrial Commission that at the time of the
accident, Mr. Phillipson was under an employment relationship
with BB&B, was under its control and was performing its work.
The result of Mr. Bundy's intended argument was to have the
Commission correctly rule that BB&B was the sole employer of Mr.
Phillipson.

These are the very substance and effect of the lent-

employee doctrine.

Accordingly, the issue was addressed by the

parties before the Industrial Commission.
B.

THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION IS NOT CONSTRAINED BY THE FINDINGS
OF FACT OR CONCLUSIONS OF LAW REACHED BY THE ADMINISTRATIVE
LAW JUDGE, AND THEREFORE MAY BASE ITS DECISION ON GROUNDS
NOT ADDRESSED BY THE ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE OR THE
PARTIES.
Petitioners allege that the Industrial Commission

"introduce[d] a completely new theory not raised by any party at
the motion for review stage of the proceedings."
- 13 -

Brief of Pet.

at 24. As a result, they demand that any such theory "simply
should be considered waived . . .."

Id.

Petitioners argue that

the allegedly new theory of the "lent-employee doctrine," which
is discussed at length in the Industrial Commission Order, should
be rejected and that the Industrial Commission be "admonished."
Id.

As demonstrated supra, the Industrial Commission did not

advance a new theory.
Mr. Bundy.

The issue had been thoroughly argued by

However, even if the issue had not been raised, the

Industrial Commission has the discretion to apply the law that is
appropriate for the just resolution of a case.
The procedural rules applicable to the Industrial Commission
when it performs the function of agency review are different from
those applicable to an appellate court.1

Specifically, the Utah

Supreme Court has stated that:
[T]here is nothing in our statutes which
limits the power of the [Industrial]
Commission itself in reviewing and adopting
or reversing the findings of its
Administrative Law Judge. Those Courts which
have dealt with this question have uniformly
held that an administrative tribunal, sitting
en banc, is not limited by the examiner's
findings, though, generally it must consider
those findings as a part of the record as a
whole.
While it appears that an appellate court may not be
able to use new legal theories on which to base its holdings, see
Limb v. Federated Milk Producers Assoc., 461 P.2d 290, 295, 22
Utah 2d 222 (Utah 1969) (Henriod, J., dissenting), those limits
do not apply to an administrative agency's review.
- 14 -

U.S. Steel Corp. v. Industrial Commission, 607 P.2d 807, 810
(Utah 1980).

The Utah Code also indicates that an agency, in

performing its review function, is not constrained by the record,
but may issue its own findings of facts and conclusions of law as
to each of the issues reviewed and indicate the reasons for its
decision.

Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-12(6)(c)(iii), (iv) and (vii).

The Utah Supreme Court has further held that "[o]ur statutes
place the responsibility for decision on the Commission, and not
on Administrative Law Judges." U.S. Steel Corp. 607 at P.2d at
811.

Thus, pursuant to its responsibility the Commission must

base its decision on appropriate grounds, and these may include
grounds that were not addressed by the Administrative Law Judge
in his/her decision.

See Dept. of Public Safety v. Jones. 578

P.2d 1197, (Okl. 1978) (cited favorably by the Utah Supreme Court
in U.S. Steel Corp. at 811).

II.

UNDER THE LENT-EMPLOYEE DOCTRINE, BB&B WAS PHILLIPSON'S 80LE
EMPLOYER.
Under the lent-employee doctrine, BB&B was Phillipson's sole

employer and therefore is solely responsible for workmen's
compensation benefits.

The proper analysis of the employment

status of Mr. Bundy and BB&B is under the lent employee doctrine.
The Industrial Commission properly applied the lent employee
- 15 -

doctrine in this case in finding that BB&B was the decedent's
sole employer for purposes of workmen's compensation.
The lent employee doctrine, as stated above, involves a
three part test:
§ 48.00. When a general employer lends an
employee to a special employer, the special
employer becomes responsible for workmen's
compensation only if:
(a) the employee has made a contract of hire,
express or implied with the special employer;
(b) the work being done is essentially that
of the special employer; and
(c) the special employer has the right to
control the details of the work.
Workmen's Compensation Law at 8-434.

The treatise continues to

explain: "When all three of the above conditions are satisfied in
relation to both employers, both employers are liable for
workmen's compensation."

Id.

(Emphasis added.)

When the

conditions apply to only one employer, there is no joint
liability.

Mr. Phillipson worked under the close supervision and

direction of BB&B, following its orders and checking in daily.
Mr. Phillipson and BB&B worked together directly without
intercession by Mr. Bundy.

Thus, both BB&B and Mr. Phillipson

consented to the implied contract between them.
Metier Hauling & Rigging Co., supra.

Eaddv v. A.J.

Moreover, the Industrial

Commission expressly found that at the time of his death, Mr.
Phillipson was performing the work of BB&B, not Mr. Bundy.
- 16 -

That

finding is not challenged by Petitioners, and is fatal to their
interpretation of the lent-employee doctrine and the so-called
joint employer doctrine they rely on.

Finally, BB&B retained

exclusive control over Mr. Phillipson's work.

Each element

having been met, BB&B was appropriately found to be the sole
employer of Mr. Phillipson.
Petitioners argue that both BB&B and Mr. Bundy meet the
conditions of the lent employee doctrine as set forth above.
Therefore, they argue that both BB&B and Bundy should be held
liable as joint employers under the "joint employment doctrine."
See Brief of Petitioners, at 18-21.

They cite two cases in

support of their argument, both of which are distinguishable from
the case on appeal.
The Petitioners first rely on Kinne v. Industrial
Commission. 609 P.2d 926 (Utah 1980), which the Administrative
Law Judge cited merely to recognize the unobjectionable fact that
"[ajn employee, for the purposes of workmen's compensation, may
have two employers."

(R. at 230 (citing Kinne. at 928)).

Kinne

involved a leased truck and driver, but under different facts
than those present in this case.

In Kinne. the Industrial

Commission had concluded that the lessee was only a statutory
employer.

Furthermore, the decedent was performing truck

maintenance at the time of injury, a job that benefited both
employers' interests.

In addition, the lessor had expressly
- 17 -

agreed by contract to provide workmen's compensation insurance
and to direct and control the driver.

Under these facts, the

court in Kinne found that the lessor was and severally liable
with the lessee for workmen's compensation payments.
The case on appeal can be distinguished from Kinne on
several grounds.

First, the Industrial Commission has determined

that BB&B's employment status was not merely statutory employer,
but was also sole employer for purposes of worker's compensation.
(R. at 278).

Second, the decedent was driving for BB&B and was

found by the Industrial Commission to be "performing the work of
BB&B on the date of his fatal industrial accident."
The Petitioners do not dispute this finding.
Petitioners, at 6.

(R. at 275).

Brief of

Finally, the agreement between Bundy and BB&B

expressly states that "Lessee [BB&B] has procured and maintains .
. . policies of Insurance covering personal injury, (Workmen's
Compensation Insurance) . . .."

(R. at 113). Therefore, the

facts upon which the ruling in Kinne was based are not existent
in this case.

Indeed, the facts in this case mandate the

conclusion that the parties are not jointly and severally liable,
but that BB&B is solely liable for workmen's compensation.
Petitioners next cite a recent Utah Court of Appeals ruling,
Aragon v. Clover Club Foods Co., 857 P.2d 250 (Utah App. 1993),
for the proposition that two companies in a business arrangement
akin to a joint venture shall be treated as one "employing unit"
- 18 -

and that employees of both companies shall be treated as "engaged
in the same employment."
Aragon, at 255).

Brief of Petitioners, at 20 (citing

The Araaon court stated that joint employment

would be found where the companies were "united for a common
purpose."

Araaon, at 255. Aragon involved one company which was

a wholly-owned subsidiary of the other.
not exist here.

Such an arrangement did

Unlike a joint venture, the purposes of BB&B and

Mr. Bundy were divergent.

The lease contract between BB&B and

Mr. Bundy is no more akin to the common purpose of a joint
venture than any arrangement whereby an independent supplier
leases or sells an item to an independent manufacturer.

There

was no joint venture in the case at hand, and Araaon is not
dispositive.
Petitioners note that Professor Larson's treatise states
that joint employment may be found in "the familiar situation of
the leased truck and driver," Worker's Compensation Law at 8553.

However, numerous courts have refused to find joint

employment in such a situation if services are performed for each
employer separately, and each employer exercises separate
control.

If control is transferred to the lessee, or the injury

occurs while the employee is performing service for the lessee,
courts have held the lessee to be solely liable for worker's
compensation.

Bennett v. Browning, 395 S.E.2d 333, 196 Ga. App.

158 (Ga. App. 1990) (affirming award of compensation solely
- 19 -

against lessee, where the driver's injury arose solely from
activities performed for the lessee); Eaddv v. A,J. Metier
Hauling & Rigging Co., 325 S.E.2d 581, 284 S.C. 270 (S.C.App.
1985).

(Although lessor owned the trucks, was responsible for

maintenance, and paid the driver, court affirmed Industrial
Commission's decision that lessee was solely liable for workmen's
compensation on grounds that lessee exercised exclusive control
over the driver in performing the lessee's work.); Danuser v.
J.A. Thompson and Son, Inc., 655 P.2d 887, 890, 3 Haw. App. 564
(Haw. App. 1982) (affirming order of Labor and Industrial
Relations Appeals Board that lessee of tractor and driver was
solely responsible for workmen's compensation since driver
performed only the lessee's work and was directed and controlled
in the work solely by lessee); Lego v. Workmen's Comp. APP. Bd.,
445 A.2d 1324, 1327, Pa. Comwlth. 593 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1982)
(affirming award of compensation benefits solely by lessee where
the truck bore the lessee's logo, the lease stated that the truck
was in the lessee's exclusive possession, the lessee had the
right to control the route, the lessee required drivers to meet
certain specifications, even though lessor paid the driver);
Craig v. Decatur Petroleum Haulers, Inc.. 340 So.2d 1127, 1130
(Ala. Ct. App. 1976), cert,

denied,

340 So.2d 1130 (Ala. 1977)

(affirming determination that lessee was the sole employer of
driver even though lessor paid driver's salary and paid for fuel,
- 20 -

since lessee could direct lessor to fire driver, could discipline
him for failing to report, and had sole discretion over driver's
routes and deliveries).
In Lester C. Newton Trucking Co. v. Neal, 204 A.2d 393, 8
Storey 55, 58 Del. 55, (Del. 1964), the Supreme Court of Delaware
was presented with the precise issue on appeal in this case.
Neal involved a truck and driver lease similar to the one
executed between BB&B and Mr. Bundy.

As in this case, the lessor

was responsible for supplying the truck and driver, would fire
any driver at the direction of lessee, and payment to the driver
was made through lessor.

Lessee had control over the direction

of the route and the cargo, and controlled the details of the
driver's employ.

The driver was killed in an accident that

occurred while he was driving a route designated by the lessee.
All of these facts are identical to the facts in this case.

The

Neal court ruled that because the lessee "had the right to
control and direct the activities of the employee in the
performance of the act which caused his injury," the lessee was
solely liable for workmen's compensation,

id., at 395.

As did the lessor in Neal, Mr. Bundy had surrendered
exclusive control of Mr. Phillipson to the lessee, BB&B.
dispatched the Mr. Phillipson and directed his routes.

BB&B

BB&B had

the right to approve or disapprove of the use of any driver, and
could order Mr. Bundy to fire any driver.
- 21 -

Mr. Phillipson was

required to file detailed reports with BB&B.

BB&B required Mr.

Phillipson to call in to BB&B's office on a daily basis while on
driving trips.

Failure to call in resulted in discipline by

means of a $50.00 fine.

BB&B agreed in the Lease Agreement to

provide Workerfs Compensation Insurance.

It is conceded that Mr.

Bundy remained the owner of the trucks and was responsible for
maintenance, fuel cost, and for paying Mr. Phillipson a
percentage of BB&B's payment to Mr. Bundy.

Nevertheless, control

of the work performed was transferred to BB&B, and Mr. Phillipson
was performing the work of BB&B at the time of his fatal
accident.

Because of these factors, the Industrial Commission

correctly determined that BB&B was Mr. Phillipson's sole employer
for purposes of worker's compensation payments.

The Court should

therefore affirm the Industrial Commission's decision.

III. BB&B'S DESIGNATION AS A STATUTORY EMPLOYER IS NOT EXCLUSIVE
DETERMINATION OP ITS STATUS.
In their Brief, Petitioners contend that the Industrial
Commission "committed reversible error by failing to recognize a
stipulation by the parties accepted by the Administrative Law
Judge that BB&B was the 'statutory employer1 of [decedent].11
Brief of Petitioners, at 23. Although Petitioners assert that
"the stipulation by WCF that BB&B was a 'statutory employer' was
the correct approach to take in this case," they cite no
- 22 -

authority supporting this position or that this designation is
exclusive.

Id.

Petitioners1 attempt to support this argument by asserting
that the stipulation was "consistent with the basic purposes of
fair compensation."

Id.

Petitioners1 attempt to focus on

whether Mr. Phillipson's heirs will receive compensation is not
relevant to the issues on this appeal.

Like Petitioners, Mr.

Bundy does not contest the prior determination that the minor
heirs of Mr. Phillipson are deserving of workmen's compensation.
That is not the issue before the Court.

Rather, the issue on

appeal is the apportionment of responsibility among the several
parties.
BB&B attempts to avoid the full measure of its
responsibility as the sole employer of decedent at the time of
his accident by claiming that its status as a statutory employer
excludes the possibility that in this case, it also assumed
control sufficient to be the sole employer.
authority for such a proposition.

Petitioners cite no

The Administrative Law Judge

did not view Petitioner BB&B's status as statutory employer as
exclusive.

Indeed, after hearing the admission of BB&B, the

Administrative Law Judge stated that "there remains an issue with
respect to whether or not BB&B Transportation, in addition to
being the statutory employer of the decedent was, in fact, his
sole employer."

(R. at 231).
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Petitioners1 attempt to use the statutory employer
provisions of Utah Code Ann. § 35-1-42 as a limitation on legal
responsibility goes directly against the legislative intent of
such provisions.

As the Utah Supreme Court has recognized, the

legislature intended that the statutory employer provision would
"forestall evasion of [workmen's compensation liability] by those
who might be tempted to subdivide their regular operations among
subcontractors, thus escaping direct employment relations . . .."
Bennett v. Industrial Commission. 726 P.2d 427, 431 (Utah 1986).
See Curtiss v. GSX Corp. of Colorado. 774 P.2d 873, 874 (Colo.
1989) ("The purpose of these statutory employer provisions is to
prevent an employer from evading compensation coverage by
contracting out work instead of directly hiring workers.11).

In

their brief, Petitioners allege that they are willing to accept
their responsibility, while Mr. Bundy is not.
Petitioners at 21.

Brief of

Quite to the contrary, Petitioners here are

attempting to avoid the full measure of their responsibility
assumed when BB&B entered the lease agreement with Mr. Bundy.
The lease provides for exclusive control to rest in BB&B, and
that control was in fact exercised according to the lease.

BB&B

also assumed the responsibility for insuring Mr. Phillipson under
workers compensation under the terms of the lease.
purchased workers compensation from WCFU.

BB&B

It is now WCFU which,

in facing the extent of this particular claim, attempts to shirk
- 24 -

its full responsibility and place the liability on Mr. Bundy
while casting itself in a magnanimous light by "conceding"
responsibility for one half of its actual liability.

In Kinne,

supraf relied upon by Petitioners, the Utah Supreme court
condemned one employer's attempts to "disclaim his liability for
compensation benefits in spite of the express terms of the
agreement making him responsible for such coverage.

It is not

unreasonable to hold a party responsible for obligations he
assumes by contract."

Kinne, 609 P.2d at 928.

In this appeal, Petitioners are flaunting the purpose of
Utah Code Ann. § 35-1-42 by using it as a shield to reduce their
legal responsibility as sole employer of decedent.
should not be allowed.

Such misuse

Instead, the Court should uphold the

Industrial Commission in looking to the overriding issue of
whether BB&B was the decedent's sole employer.2

Clearly it was,

and the Industrial Commission's order should be affirmed.

In addition, as stated above, the Industrial Commission is
not compelled to accept either the findings of fact or
conclusions of law entered by the Administrative Law Judge. See
U.S. Steel Corp. v. Industrial Commission, 607 P.2d 807, 810
(Utah 1980). Thus, the Industrial Commission was not required,
as Petitioners contend, to accept the Administrative Law Judge's
conclusion that BB&B was indeed the decedent's statutory
employer.
- 25 -

CONCLUSION
The Industrial Commission correctly recognized that
Phillipson was a lent employee of BB&B at the time of his fatal
accident.

Because BB&B had reserved to itself the right of

control of Mr. Phillipson, and in fact exercised that control,
BB&B was appropriately found to be the sole employer.

The

decision of the Industrial Commission holding Petitioners solely
and fully liable for the death benefits in this case should be
affirmed.
DATED this 31st day of October, 1994.

Respectfully Submitted,
KIRTON & McCONKIE

David M. Wahlquist f
Stuart F. Weed
Attorneys for Respondent
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MARK BUNDY in this matter by mailing them by first class mail
with sufficient postage prepaid to the following:
James R. Black, Esq.
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Richard G. Sumsion
Workers Compensation Fund
392 East 6400 South
Murray, UT 84107
Sharon Eblen, Esq.
Uninsured Employer's Fund
160 East 300 South #300
Salt Lake City, UT 84111
Kevin Sutterfield
Attorney at Law
120 East 300 North
Provo, UT 84606
Irene Warr
Attorney at law
311 South State St., Suite 280
Salt Lake City, UT 84111

David M. Wahlquist
Stuart F. Weed
Attorneys of Record
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THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH
Case No.

92-926 & 92-1132

JOSHUA J. NEWTON, Minor Dependent*
Stepson of, and SHAYLA MARIA
*
PHILLIPSEN, STEPHEN BURDELL
*
PHILLIPSEN, and JAZMIN DANIELLE *
PHILLIPSEN, Minor Dependent
*
Children of ROBERT T. PHILLIPSEN,*
Deceased,
*
Applicants,

FINDINGS OF FACT
*

vs.
MARK BUNDY dba MARK BUNDY
TRUCKING (UNINSURED), B B & B
TRANSPORTATION and/or WORKERS
COMPENSATION FUND OF UTAH,
UNINSURED EMPLOYERS FUND,

*
*
*
*
*
*

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
AND ORDER

Defendants.
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *

*
*

HEARING:

Hearing Room 334, Industrial Commission of Utah, 160
East 300 South, Salt Lake City, Utah, on April 22,
1993, at 1:00 o'clock p.m.; same being pursuant to
Order and Notice of the Commission.

BEFORE:

Timothy C. Allen, Presiding Administrative Law
Judge.

APPEARANCES:

Applicants were represented by Kevin Sutterfield,
Attorney at Law.
Defendant, Mark Bundy was present and represented by
Stuart Weed, Attorney at Law.
Defendant, B B & B Transportation was represented by
Irene Warr, Attorney at Law.
The defendant, Workers Compensation Fund of Utah,
was represented by Richard G. Sumsion, Attorney at
Law.
The Uninsured Employers Fund was represented by
Thomas C. Sturdy, Attorney at Law.
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At the conclusion of the evidentiary hearing, the matter was
taken under advisement by the Administrative Law Judge. Being
fully advised in the premises, the Administrative Law Judge is
prepared to enter the following

FINDINGS OF FACT:
At the outset of the evidentiary hearing, the Workers
Compensation Fund of Utah, by and through counsel, notified the
Administrative Law Judge that it and its insured, B B & B
Transportation, were stipulating that B B & B Transportation was
the statutory employer of the decedent, Robert T. Phillipsen. In
light of the Stipulation, the litigation of the statutory employer
issue was thus rendered moot. However, there remains an issue with
respect to whether or not B B & B Transportation, in addition to
being the statutory employer of the decedent was, in fact, his sole
employer. Dispositive Motions had previously been filed by the
parties, which were taken under advisement pending -the conclusion
of the evidentiary hearing. Therefore, the issues have been well
briefed. As will appear from the discussion which will follow, the
Administrative Law Judge found and concluded that the decedent, Mr.
Phillipsen, had two employers at the time of his death, his common
law or actual employer, Mark Bundy, and his statutory employer,
B B & B Transportation.
The decedent herein, Robert T. Phillipsen, was driving a truck
owned by Bundy Trucking and leased to B B & B Transportation when
he was involved in a fatal industrial accident on May 10, 1991. At
the time of his death, there were four minor children living in his
home, who were dependent upon him for support, namely, Joshua J.
Newton, (DOB: 2-22-85), Shayla Marie Phillipsen, (DOB: 7-15-86),
Stephen Burdell Phillipsen, (DOB: 4-7-88), and Jazmin Danielle
Phillipsen, (DOB: 1-17-92).
The decedent was also married to
Melanie Phillipsen, who was living with him at the time of his
death. Melanie Phillipsen filed a claim for workers compensation
benefits with the Industrial Commission on August 3, 1992.
Thereafter, the Uninsured Employers Fund, by and through counsel,
filed a Motion to Dismiss Mrs. Phillipsen's claim on the grounds
that she did not file the same within one year of the decedents
date of death as required by §35-1-98. The Administrative Law
Judge in a letter Order of November 16, 1992, granted the Motion to
Dismiss on behalf of the Uninsured Employers Fund as to Melanie
Phillipsen. However, the Administrative Law Judge also found that
the effects of §35-1-98, are tolled by §78-12-36, with respect to
the minor dependent children of the deceased. No appeal having
been taken of that Order, that Order is now the final award of the
Commission.
Based on that Order, the claim was styled as is
presently provided.
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At the time of his death, the decedent was averaging $1,978
per month in wages. Based on the foregoing, the dependents of the
deceased would be entitled to a base compensation award of $305.00
per week when rounded to the nearest whole dollar.
When the
dependents allowance is added to the award, the applicants are then
entitled to the maximum award provided by law of $309.00 per week.
Since there are four dependents of the deceased, each child shall
be entitled to an award of $77.25 per week. The benefits to be
awarded to the minor dependents shall be placed in trust accounts
at the Mountain America Credit Union, and shall be disbursed only
upon a written showing of need. Upon reaching the age of eighteen,
the balance found remaining in each account shall become the sole
property of that child. The total award for the initial six years
shall be $96,408.00, which would entitle each child to an award of
$24,102.00 for the first six years of benefits.
As intimated earlier, the remaining issues in this case
involve whether or not the applicant was the sole employee of
B B & B Transportation, and if not, if the Uninsured Employers Fund
is jointly and severally liable along with Mr. Bundy and the
statutory employer, for the benefits in this case. The defendant,
Mark Bundy, points to the Lease Agreement as between himself and
the defendant, B B & B Transportation as support for his position
that B B & B Transportation was the sole employer, in fact, of the
applicant. As a related issue, Bundy also argues that because of
Exhibit D-3, which is an Independent Contractor Agreement between
Bundy and the deceased, Bundy urges that the applicant was also an
independent contractor.
That Agreement in its Recital section indicates that the
contract is being made between the owner, Mark Bundy, and Mr.
Phillipsen, who is denominated as a contractor.
The Recital
section indicates that the owner owns certain trucks and trucking
equipment and operates a truck ownership business and that he
desires Phillipsen as the contractor, to perform the services of
trucking and truck driving.
For these services, the Agreement
provides that the decedent would receive 20% of the revenue
generated by the load taken, and that he would receive dispatches
from B B & B Transportation. The Agreement in its "Relationship
of Parties" section states the following provision: "The parties
intend this contract to create an employer - independent contractor
relationship." The Agreement concludes that the decedent would
hold Bundy harmless from any and all liability for workers
compensation or any other liability which might be subsequently
imposed on Bundy.
This particular provision of the contract
appears to be void on its face since it would appear to run
contrary to the provisions of §35-1-90, Utah Code Annotated. That
section provides that: "No agreement by an employee to waive his
rights to compensation under this title shall be valid."
The
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Agreement goes on to provide that Bundy will supply the truck and
equipment, and will provide for all maintenance for the equipment.
In reviewing the Agreement and the evidence on the file, it
would appear that there was no negotiation of the various terms of
that Agreement. It would further appear that the parties did not
possess equal bargaining power, in that Bundy owned the truck,
while the only asset that Phillipsen possessed was his ability to
drive truck.
This issue of the effect of an independent contractor
agreement executed by a driver has been previously addressed by the
Utah Supreme Court in the matter of Harry L. Young & Sons v.
Ashton. P2d 316 (Utah 1975) .
In the Ashton case, the Court
addressed the legal effect of an "Independent Contractor Agreement"
similar to that executed by Bundy and the decedent in this matter.
There the Court indicated:
It should be had in mind that the issue is not
whether Dennis A. Ashton was an employee of
Young in the dictionary sense, nor is it to be
determined solely from the terms used.
Particularly, its character is not necessarily
fixed by the fact that the agreement recites
that it is not an employer - employee
relationship, but is that of an independent
contractor. The question of entitlement to
workman's compensation depends on whether the
facts and circumstances bring him within the
requirements of the Workmens Compensation Act.
The applicable statutory provision which governs this case is
found in §35-1-42 (5)(a), which provides:
*

5) (a)

*

*

If any person who is an employer procures
any work to be done wholly or in part for
him by a contractor over whose work he
retains supervision or control, and this
work is a part or process in the trade or
business of the employer, the contractor,
all persons employed
by him, all
subcontractors under him, and all persons
employed by any of these subcontractors,
are considered employees of the original
employer.

1

/ \s « ^ A * fc
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Section 42, in subsection (2)(b) defines the term independent
contractor:
"Independent contractor" means any person
engaged in the performance of any work for
another who, while so engaged, is independent of
the employer in all that pertains to the execution
of the work, is not subject to the rule or control
of the employer, is engaged only in the performance
of a definite job or piece of work, and is
subordinate to the employer only in effecting a
result in accordance with the employer's design.
The Court in Ashton went on to state:
Speaking in generality: an employee is one who
is hired and paid a salary, a wage, or at a
fixed rate, to perform the employer's work as
directed by the employer and who is subject to
a comparatively high degree of control in
performing those duties.
In contrast, an
independent contractor is one who is engaged
to do some particular project or piece of
work, usually for a set total sum, who may do
the job in his own way, subject to only
minimal restrictions or controls and is
responsible
only
for
its
satisfactory
completion.
To provide guidance in this area, the Court set forth the
following parameters:
The main facts to be considered as bearing on
the relationship here are: (1) Whatever
covenants or agreements exist concerning the
right of direction and control over the
employee, whether express or implied; (2) The
right to hire and fire; (3) The method of
payment, i.e., whether in wages or fees, as
compared to payment for a complete job or
project; and (4) The furnishing of the
equipment. (Citation omitted).
In applying the foregoing legal requirements to the facts of
this case, I find that as the Court found in Ashton. that although
the parties recited in their lease that they had an independent
contractor relationship, the employee, Mr. Phillipsen, had no real
choice. Mr. Phillipsen was paid 20% of the revenue generated for
the load that he took, and there was no evidence offered to
indicate that he had any negotiation or bargaining power whatsoever
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with respect to that term of the agreement. Further, the truck Mr.
Phillipsen was driving was owned by Mark Bundy.
There was no
provision in the contract whereby Mr. Phillipsen could refuse to
haul a load or an oversized load for that matter. Further, Mr.
Bundy had the governor mechanism repaired on the truck that Mr.
Phillipsen was driving, so that Mr. Phillipsen could not exceed a
certain speed limit. With respect to the relationship between Mr.
Bundy and Mr. Phillipsen, Mr. Bundy also retained the power of
control over the decedent. Although the Independent Contractor
Agreement did not retain that power, Mr. Bundy retained that power
in a separate lease agreement he executed in 1990, with B B & B
Transportation.
In that agreement, Mr. Bundy was to furnish a
driver and was to "have full and exclusive responsibility for. . .
hiring, setting the wages, hours and working conditions of and
adjusting the grievances of, supervising, training, disciplining
and firing of all drivers. . . ", 1990 (Lease at I 3 (A)).
Therefore, the Administrative Law Judge finds that this case
represents the fact situation anticipated by the Supreme Court when
it made its observation that:
The employer wanted the "best of two possible
worlds." On the one hand to have a person
rendering a service over whom he can maintain
a high degree of control, and at the same time
give the person the status of an independent
contractor to avoid the responsibilities he
would have to an employee.
Based on the foregoing discussion, I find and conclude that
Robert T. Phillipsen was an employee of Mark Bundy Trucking on May
10, 1991, when he sustained his fatal compensable industrial
accident.
As indicated just previously, there was a separate Lease
Agreement as between Mark Bundy and B B & B Transportation. That
Agreement provided that Bundy, as the owner-operator of certain
trailers and 18 wheel tractors, would furnish that equipment to
B B & B Transportation.
That Agreement provided that B B & B
Transportation would "Have complete care, custody and control of
both the leased equipment and the drivers furnished therewith. . ."
(Lease at J 3). That Agreement also provided that B B & B«
Transportation would furnish the general and workers compensation
coverage (Lease at J 10,) and would require that all drivers check
in with B B & B Transportation before making any trip (Lease at
5 11). The agreement went on to provide that Bundy would pay all
equipment expenses including fuel, oil, repairs, taxes and license
fees (Lease at J 3 (D)) . And that Bundy shall: "Have full and
exclusive responsibility for. . . hiring, setting the wages, etc.,
of the drivers." Based on the foregoing provisions of the Lease
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Agreement between himself and B B & B Transportation, Bundy urges
that B B & B Transportation was the sole employer of the decedent.
However, by the very terms of his Lease Agreement with B B &
B Transportation, Bundy retained the right of control over the
activities of the decedent, Phillipsen, The surviving spouse of
the decedent testified that she took approximately ten trips with
the decedent and on each of those trips, the decedent was required
to report in tc B B & B Transportation on a very regular basis
concerning his whereabouts at all times. The payment arrangement
between the parties was such that B B & B Transportation would pay
Bundy 85% of the revenue generated for the load taken
decedent, and Bundy, in turn, would pay Phillipsen his 20% share of
the revenue generated.
Therefore, under the terms of the 1990
Lease Agreement, Bundy had the right of control over Phillipsen,
and he also had the right to hire and fire Phillipsen.
In
addition, Bundy paid Phillipsen's wages, and he owned and leased
the tractor and trailer used by Phillipsen in the performance of
his duties. Based on these factors, and in reliance on the Supreme
Court decision in the matter of Charles Kinne v. Industrial
Commission. 609 P2d 926 (Utah 1980), I find and conclude that Mark
Bundy is jointly and severally liable with B B & B Transportation
for the compensation award in this matter. I find, as the Court
did in Kinne, that: "An employee, for the purpose of workmen's
compensation may have two employers."
One final issue involves the relationship of the Uninsured
Employers Fund and whether or not i t has liability for benefits in
this matter, since the uninsured employer, Mark Bundy, has been
assessed with joint and several liability. The Uninsured Employers
Fund relies upon its reading of §35-1-107 (1 ) , ti ::> conclude that
they have no liability. Section 35-1-107 (1), states:
There is created an Uninsured Employers Fund.
The Fund has the purpose of assisting in the
payment of workers compensation benefits to
any person entitled to them, if that person's
employer is individually-iointly, or severally
liable to pay the benefits, but becomes or is
insolvent, appoints or has appointed a
receiver,
or
otherwise
does
not
have
sufficient funds, insurance, sureties, or
other security to cover workers compensation
liabilities. If it becomes necessary to pay
benefits, the Fund is liable for all
obligations of the employer as set forth in
Title 35, Chapters 1 and 2, with the
exceptions of penalties on those obligations.

^V'.^^}; c
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The Uninsured Employers Fund takes the position that n
only secondarily liable, and that the statutory employer, B B <
Transportation is primarily liable for benefits, and that the
Uninsured Employers Fund only has liability in the event that the
statutory employer and the uninsured employer are unable to pay
benefits.
That reading of §35-1-107, seems to give no effect
whatsoever to the 1988 amendment to §35-1-107. The 1988 amendment
struck the qualifier every which appeared before employer in §35-1107. In the pre-1988 version of §107, the Act provided that the
Uninsured Employers Fund had no liability unless every employer of
the applicant was insolvent. The Legislature in the 1988 amendment
specifically removed the word every from that statute. I can only
conclude that the intent of the Legislature in removing the word
every was to overcome the effects of the decision in Jacobsen v.
Industrial Commission. 738 P2d 658, (Utah 1987).
In tiidu wb^
Uninsured Employers Fund and the Workers
Compensation Fund oi t Jtah litigated whether or not every employer
of the applicant had to be insolvent before the Uninsured Employers
Fund would have liability. In that case, the Court found that the
term every meant what ::i I: said, and, as such,,
Workers
Compensation Fund of Utah was assessed liability in that case,
since only the uninsured employer was insolvent. The Administrative Law Judge can only presume that in order to overcome the
ruling in the Jacobsen case, the Legislature, in its infinite
wisdom, removed the requirement that every employer be insolvent
before Uninsured Employer Fund liability would be trigger2d. To
adopt the position of the Uninsured Employers Fund which was urged
at hearing, would mean that the Administrative Law Judge by
administrative fiat and decision would repeal the 1988 amendment to
§35-1-107. That step this Administrative Law Judge will not take.
Therefore, I find that based on my reading of §35-1-107, it would
appear that the Uninsured Employers Fund has joint and several
liability with the statutory employer upon the uninsured employer
being unable to pay benefits i n a case.
Applying the foregoing reasoning to this case, I find that the
death benefits to be awarded to the minor dependents shall be paid
in the first instance by the Workers Compensation Fund of Utah, and
the Workers Compensation Fund of Utah shall be entitled to 50%
reimbursement from Mark Bundy. In the event Mark Bundy is without
sufficient assets or surities to pay his portion of the award, then
the Uninsured Employers Fund, pursuant to §107 of the Act, shall
then step in and make the payments in Bundy's stead. .
The applicants herein, have had the benefit of legal counsel
in these proceedings. As a result, counsel is entitled to a fee
for his services. The attorneys fee rule provides that the maximum
fee payable on a workers compensation case is $7,500.00. Based on
the amount recovered for the applicants, counsel is entitled to the
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maximum fee. That fee shall be deducted equally from each of the
applicant's benefits, which will result i n a deduction of $1 ,875 ,00
from each child's accrued award.
CONCLUSIONS OF

:

Robert T. Phillipsen was an employee of Mark Bundy dba Mark
Bundy Trucking on May 10, 1991# when he sustained his fatal
industrial accident.
In addition, Robert T. Phillipsen was a
statutory employee of B B & B Transportation on May 10, 1991, when
he sustained his fatal industrial accident. B B & B Transportation
and Mark Bundy are jointly and severally liable for the death
benefits due and owing to the applicants as the result of the
industrial accident sustained by Robert T. Phillipsen on May 10,
1991, during the course and scope of his employment. Pursuant to
§35-1-107, the Uninsured Employers Fund is jointly and severally
liable with the Workers Compensation Fund of Utah for death
benefits in this matter in the event, Mark Bundy is insolvent or
lacks sufficient assets or sureties to satisfy his portion of the
award <« i-hi« matterORDER:
IT
THEREFORE ORDERED that Mark Bundy and/or
Transportation/Workers Compensation Fund of Utah pay Mountain
America Credit Union, $24,102.00, for deposit in share account
#74787-2, which account has as its owner, Joshua J. Newton. No
disbursements shall be made from the account without the written
authorization of the Commission upon a showing of need.
The
benefits awarded herein shall commence effective May 11, 1991, at
the rate of $77.25 per week, and shall terminate on or about May 2,
1997.
Accrued amounts shall be paid in a lump sum including
interest of 8% per annum. The defendants shall deduct $1,875.00
from the accrued award to Joshua, and shall remit the same to Kevin
Sutterfield, attorney for the applicants, for services rendered in
this matter.
IT

IS

FURTHER

0RDERED

that

Mark

Bundy

a n d y o r fi B

&

B

Transportation/Workers Compensation Fund of Utah pay Mountain
America Credit Union, $24,102.00, for deposit :i i i share account
#74788-0, which account has as its owner, Shayla M. Phillipsen. No
disbursements shall be made from the account without the written
authorization of the Commission upon a showing of need.
The
benefits awarded herein shall commence effective May 11, 1991, at
the rate of $77.25 per week, and shall terminate on or about May 2,
1997.
Accrued amounts shall be paid in a lump sum including
interest of 8% per annum. The defendants shall deduc*" ei ,875.00
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from the accrued award to Shay la, and shall remit the same to Kevin
Sutterfield, attorney for the applicants, for services rendered in
this matter.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Mark Bundy and/or B B & B
Transportation/Workers Compensation Fund of Utah pay Mountain
America Credit Union, $24,102.00, for deposit in share account
#74789-8, which account has as its owner, Stephen B. Phillipsen.
No disbursements shall be made from the account without the written
authorization of the Commission upon a showing of need. The
benefits awarded herein shall commence effective May 11, 1991, at
the rate of $77.25 per week, and shall terminate on or about May 2,
1997.
Accrued amounts shall be paid in a lump sum including
interest of 8% per annum. The defendants shall deduct $1,875.00
from the accrued award to Stephen, and shall remit the same to
Kevin Sutterfield, attorney for the applicants, for services
rendered in this matter.
ORDERED that Mark Bundy and/or B B & B
IT
IS
FURTHER
Transportation/Workers Compensation Fund of Utah pay Mountain
America Credit Union, $24,102.00, for deposit in share account
#74790-6, which account has as its owner, Jazmin D. Phillipsen. No
disbursements shall be made from the account without the written
authorization of the Commission upon a showing of need.
The
benefits awarded herein shall commence effective May 11, 1991, at
the rate of $77.25 per week, and shall terminate on or about May 2,
1997.
Accrued amounts shall be paid in a lump sum including
interest of 8% per annum. The defendants shall deduct $1,875.00
from the accrued award to Jazmin, and shall remit the same to Kevin
Sutterfield, attorney for the applicants, for services rendered in
this matter.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Mountain America Credit Union mail
quarterly statements to the children c/o Melanie Phillipsen, 148
West 100 North, #A-1# Nephi, UT 84648. Mrs. Phillipsen shall
furnish Mountain America Credit Union with social security numbers
for the children to facilitate the reporting of interest income,
and she is responsible for the filing of any required income tax
returns.
IT ±S FURTHER ORDERED that the defendants, Mark Bundy and/or
B B & B Transportation/Workers Compensation Fund of Utah, shall pay
Kevin Sutterfield, attorney for the applicants, the sum of
$7,500.00, for services rendered in this matter, the same to be
deducted from the aforesaid awards to the children as previously
provided.
II IS FURTHER ORDERED tha*
Workers Compensation Fund sha'

about March
id ration

xw /, the
Dependency
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forms „ Melanie Phillipsen prior to the termination Df the
benefits awarded to the children herein. Thereafter, the children
will be entitled to continuing death benefits from the defendants
less an offset for 50% of the Social Security death benefits
received by them at that time.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the benefits awarded herein shall
be paid in full in the first instance by the Workers Compensation
Fund of Utah. The Workers Compensation Fund shall thereafter be
entitled to reimbursement for 50% of the benefits paid in this
matter from Mark Bundy on a quarterly basis
Ii i the event Mark
Bundy is without sufficient assets or sureties or is insolvent and
is therefore unable to pay his 50% portion of the benefits in this
matter, then the Uninsured Employers Fund shall make those payments
for Bundy, and they shall reimburse the Workers Compensation Fund
of Utah on a quarterly basis.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that any Motion for Review of
foregoing shall be filed in writing within thirty (30) days of
date hereof# specifying in detail the particular errors
objections, and, unless so filed, this Order shall be final and
subject to review or appeal.

the
the
and
not

c\

lien
dministrati ve I i

judge

Certified this £,r^ day
May, 1993.
ATTEST:
Patricia 0. Ashby j
Commission Secretary
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I certify that on May {p*
1993^
a c o p y of
the
attached Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order, in the
case of Robert T. Phillipsen, Deceased, was mailed to the following
persons at the following addresses, postage paid:
Melanie Phillipsen
148 West 100 North
Nephi, UT 84648
Kevin sutterfield
Attorney at Law
P 0. Box 778
t i: ::> \ i ::::>, UT 84603
Mark Bundy Trucking
P. 0. Box 192
Nephi, UT 8464ft
Stuart Weed
Attorney at Law
60 East South Temple, Suite 1800
SLC, UT 84111-1004
B Transportation
Box 7061
- "V. UT 8*
Thomas Sturdy
Attorney at Law
Uninsured Employers Fund
Richard G* Sums ion
Attorney at Law
Workers Compensation Fund of Utah
P. 0. Box 57929
SLC f UT 84157
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THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-6600
JOSHUA J. NEWTON, Minor Dependent
Stepson of, and SHAYLA MARIA
PHILLIPSON, STEPHEN BURDELL
PHILLIPSON, and JAZMIN DANIELLE
PHILLIPSON, Minor Dependent
Children of ROBERT T. PHILLIPSON,
Deceased.

*
*
*
*
*
*
*

vs.

*

ORDER
GRANTING
MOTION FOR REVIEW

*

MARK BUNDY dba MARK BUNDY TRUCKING *
(uninsured), BB & B TRANSPORTATION *
and/or WORKERS' COMPENSATION FUND *
OF UTAH, UNINSURED EMPLOYERS' FUND,*
Respondents.

Case Nos. 92-926
& 92-1132

*

* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *

The Industrial Commission of Utah (ffCommission") reviews the
motion for review of the applicant in the above captioned matter,
pursuant to Utah Code Annotated, Section 35-1-82.53 and Section 63
-46b-12.
The minor dependent children of Robert T. Phillipson
("applicants") filed a claim for workers' compensation death
benefits pursuant to the industrially caused death of their father.
BB & B Transportation ("BB & B") stipulated that it was the
statutory employer of Mr. Phillipson. The administrative law judge
("ALJ") found that the Mark Bundy dba Bundy Trucking ("Bundy") was
Mr. Phillipson's common law or actual employer and ordered that the
liability for the payment of benefits be shared jointly and
severally between Bundy and BB & B. The ALJ ordered that benefits
to be paid initially by the Workers' Compensation Fund of Utah
("WCFU"), BB & B's insurer, with a right to recover 50% of the
benefits paid from Bundy. If Bundy does not have sufficient assets
to pay his 50% portion of benefits, the Uninsured Employers' Fund
("UEF") was ordered to make the payments for Bundy.
Respondent Bundy filed a motion for review asserting that BB
& B was the sole employer of Phillipson and that Phillipson was an
independent contractor to Bundy. The UEF filed a motion for review
of that portion of the order which ordered the UEF to pay benefits
if Bundy is unable to pay his share of the award.
We hereby adopt the findings of fact contained in the
administrative law judge's order of May 6, 1993 with the following
additional finding:
1.
Phillipson was performing the work of BB & B on the date of
his fatal industrial accident.
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I. WAS BB & B PHILLIPSON'S SOLE EMPLOYER?
Bundy argues that BB & B was Phillipson's sole employer and,
therefore, solely liable for his workers' compensation benefits.
It appears that the Lease Agreement between Bundy and BB & B
provides that Bundy lease a truck and loan a driver to BB & B. A
loaned employee may be the employee of either the general employer
or the special employer depending upon the circumstances of the
case.1 According to Professor Larson, the general employer will be
presumed liable unless it can be shown that the special employer
has been substituted for the general employer. To overcome the
presumption, the evidence must show:
(1) a contract of hire
between the special employer and the employee; (2) proof that the
work being done at the time of injury was essentially the work of
the special employer; and (3) proof that the special employer
assumed the right to control the details of the work. Id. at 8457.
Utah courts have determined that the right to supervision and
control is the most important factor for determining whether an
employee/employer relationship exists.2 Utah law further provides
that a contract between an employee and special employer may be
implied by conduct of the parties.3
The decedent and Bundy entered into an agreement whereby
decedent
agreed
to ffreceiv[e] dispatches
from BB
& B
Transportation." The agreement was entered on January 22, 1991.
The decedent's spouse testified that she took approximately ten
trips with the decedent and that on each of those trips the
decedent was required to report in to BB & B on a regular basis.
The evidence indicates that the decedent regularly drove for BB &
B and agreed to an employee/employer relationship between himself
and BB & B.
The Lease Agreement stated that BB & B was an "irregular route
for hire carrier [with ICC authorization to transport] General
Commodities between points in the Continental United States." The
decedent regularly operated a truck transporting commodities for BB
& B and was doing so at the time of his fatal industrial accident.
Therefore, at the time of his accident, decedent was performing the
work of BB & B and not Bundy.

1

See LARSON'S WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION LAW § 48.00. (1992 Ed.)

2

Harry L. Young & Sons. Inc. v. Ashton, 538 P.2d 316 (Utah

1975).
3

Bambroucrh v. Bethers. 552 P.2d 1286, 1292 (Utah 1976).

OOSvo

ROBERT T. PHILLIPSON
ORDER
PAGE THREE
The Lease Agreement between Bundy and BB & B provided that
Bundy "shall furnish a driver or drivers for each unit of the
Leased Equipment" and that the Lessee (BB & B) "shall have the
complete care, custody and control of both the Leased Equipment and
drivers
furnished
therewith..."
(emphasis added). The agreement
further provides that Bundy "shall have full and exclusive
responsibility for:
(A) hiring, setting the wages, hours and
working conditions of and adjusting the grievances of, supervising,
training, disciplining and firing of all drivers..." Thus, BB & B
had the ultimate right to control the decedent's work. Bundy's
role was either that of a supervisor for BB & B or an employer who
retained some control over his loaned employee. Bundy's failure to
relinquish all control over his loaned employee does not affect the
application of the loaned servant doctrine.
BB & B exercised the right to control the loaned employees
that was granted in the Lease Agreement.
BB & B required the
decedent to report to its dispatcher each day before 10:00 a.m.
Mountain Time and to haul only loads that BB & B approved. BB & B
also had the right to refuse to use any driver provided by Bundy.
These factors support the conclusion that BB & B exercised the
right to control the work of the decedent.
The Lease Agreement further provided that BB & B would provide
workers' compensation insurance.
Therefore, a preponderance of
the evidence supports the conclusion that decedent was a loaned
employee in the service of BB & B at the time of his fatal
industrial accident.6
Therefore, the liability for payment of
4

"It has never been held by this Court that for the loaned
servant doctrine to apply, the original employer must completely
surrender all control over his loaned employee."
Bambrouah v.
Bethers at 1292.
5

"It is not unreasonable to hold a party responsible for
obligations he assumes by contract."
Kinne v. Industrial
Commission, 609 P.2d 926 (Utah 1980).
6

This case may be distinguished from Kinne v. Industrial
Commission. 609 P.2d 926 (Utah 1980) , in which both the truck owner
and lessee were held liable for benefits. In Kinne. the employee
was injured while performing truck maintenance, a job which
benefitted both the truck owner and the lessee. In the present
case, decedent was performing the work of the lessee at the time of
his injury. The contract in Kinne provided that the lessor would
provide workers' compensation insurance and be responsible for the
direction and control of the drivers. In this case, the contract
provided that the lessee would provide workers' compensation
insurance and retain the ultimate right to direct and control the

COST:'

ROBERT T. PHILLIPSON
ORDER
PAGE FOUR
workers' compensation benefits rests solely with BB & B and its
insurance carrier, the Workers' Compensation Fund of Utah.
CONCLUSION OF LAW:
We conclude that decedent was a loaned employee solely in the
service of BB & B at the time of the fatal industrial accident.
Therefore, Bundy and, by extension, the Uninsured Employers' Fund,
are not liable for any portion of the benefits awarded.
We will not address the additional issues raised by the
parties because they are rendered moot by our decision above.
ORDER:
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that the findings of fact of the
administrative law judge are adopted as amended above.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the order of the
administrative law judge dated May 6, 1993 be amended to read as
follows:
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that BB & B Transportation
/Workers' Compensation Fund of Utah pay Mountain America
Credit Union , $24,102.00 for deposit in share account
#74787-2, which account has as its owner Joshua J.
Newton. No disbursements shall be made from the account
without the written authorization of the Commission upon
a showing of need. The benefits awarded herein shall
commence effective May 11, 1991, at the rate of $77.25
per week, and shall terminate on or about May 2, 1997.
Accrued amounts shall be paid in a lump sum including
interest of 8% per annum. The defendants shall deduct
$1,875.00 from the accrued award to Joshua, and shall
remit the same to Kevin Sutter field, attorney for the
applicants, for services rendered in this matter.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that BB & B Transportation
/Workers' Compensation Fund of Utah pay Mountain America
Credit Union , $24,102.00 for deposit in share account
#74788-0, which account has as its owner Shayla M.
Phillipson. No disbursements shall be made from the
account without the written authorization of the
Commission upon a showing of need. The benefits awarded
herein shall commence effective May 11, 1991, at the rate
of $77.25 per week, and shall terminate on or about May
2, 1997. Accrued amounts shall be paid in a lump sum
drivers.
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including interest of 8% per annum. The defendants shall
deduct $1,875-00 from the accrued award to Shayla, and
shall remit the same to Kevin Sutterfield, attorney for
the applicants, for services rendered in this matter.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that BB & B Transportation
/Workers' Compensation Fund of Utah pay Mountain America
Credit Union , $24,102.00 for deposit in share account
#74789-8, which account has as its owner Stephen B.
Phillipson.
No disbursements shall be made from the
account without the written authorization of the
Commission upon a showing of need. The benefits awarded
herein shall commence effective May 11, 1991, at the rate
of $77.25 per week, and shall terminate on or about May
2, 1997. Accrued amounts shall be paid in a lump sum
including interest of 8% per annum. The defendants shall
deduct $1,875.00 from the accrued award to Stephen, and
shall remit the same to Kevin Sutterfield, attorney for
the applicants, for services rendered in this matter.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that BB & B Transportation
/Workers' Compensation Fund of Utah pay Mountain America
Credit Union , $24,102.00 for deposit in share account
#74790-6, which account has as its owner Jazmin D.
Phillipson.
No disbursements shall be made from the
account without the written authorization of the
Commission upon a showing of need. The benefits awarded
herein shall commence effective May 11, 1991, at the rate
of $77.'25 per week, and shall terminate on or about May
2, 1997. Accrued amounts shall be paid in a lump sum
including interest of 8% per annum. The defendants shall
deduct $1,875.00 from the accrued award to Jazmin, and
shall remit the same to Kevin Sutterfield, attorney for
the applicants, for services rendered in this matter.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Mountain America Credit
Union mail quarterly statements to the children c/o
Melanie Phillipson, 148 West 100 North, #A-1, Nephi, UT
84648. Mrs. Phillipson shall furnish Mountain America
Credit Union with social security numbers for the
children to facilitate the reporting of interest income,
and she is responsible for filing any required income tax
returns•
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the defendants, B B & B
Transportation /Workers' Compensation Fund of Utah, shall
pay Kevin Sutterfield, Attorney for the applicant, the
sum of $7500.00, for services rendered in this matter,
the same to be deducted from the aforesaid awards to the
children as previously provided.
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IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that on or about March 1,
1997, the Workers' Compensation Fund shall send
Declaration of Dependency forms to Melanie Phillipson
prior to the termination of the benefits awarded to the
children herein.
Thereafter, the children will be
entitled to continuing death benefits from the defendants
less an offset for 50% of the Social Security death
benefits received by them at that time.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that any Motion for Review of
the foregoing shall be filed in writing within thirty
(30) days of the date hereof, specifying in detail the
particular errors and objections, and, unless so filed,
this Order shall be final and not subject to review or
appeal.

Any request for reconsideration by the Industrial Commission
must be filed within 20 days of the date of this Order. A request
for reconsideration is not required prior to filing an appeal to
the Utah Court of Appeals. An appeal to the Utah Court of Appeals
must be filed within 30 days of the date of this Order.

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I, Adell Butler-Mitchell, certify that I did mail by prepaid
first class postage, except as noted below, a copy of the ORDER
GRANTING MOTION FOR REVIEW in the case of JOSHUA J. NEWTON & SHAYLA

MARIA PHILLIPSON, Case Number 92-926 & 92-1132, on A
ff/^dav of
n

y)i!~-u<cJ--~~

lsHf

to the following:

MELANIE PHILLIPSEN
148 WEST 100 NORTH #A-1
NEPHI, UTAH 84648
KEVIN SUTTERFIELD
P O BOX 778
PROVO, UTAH 84603
MARK BUNDY TRUCKING
P 0 BOX 192
NEPHI, UTAH 846548
STUART WEED
60 EAST SOUTH TEMPLE
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH

SUITE 1800
84111-1004

B B & B TRANSPORTATION
P O BOX 7061
MURRAY, UTAH 84107
RICHARD G. SUMSION
WORKERS COMPENSATION FUND OF UTAH
THOMAS STURDY
UNINSURED EMPLOYERS FUND
CINDY PETERSON
MOUNTAIN AMERICA CREDIT UNION
P O BOX 45001
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 84145
T. C. ALLEN
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE

Adell But^ter-Mitchell
Paralegal
General Counsel's Office
Industrial Commission of Utah
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LEASE AGREEMENT, Exaouttd this /<£ day of v-2J'^LtnMy A^9S by and
between BBAB, INC./dbaBB&B TRAtePORTAIIOH, IHC. (lessee), t eorperatien
of Utah, 4154 So* 300 Weet, Hurray, Ut 84107 and

$(i<{t/y^acki}<i

»*(n)

^Jylfct/rf

Of
(leeggQ

VlTISSSHHl
VHEREAS, LESSEE i s an irregular route for»hire carrier holding
operating authority issued by the Interstate Qoaseree Oonisaion (ICC)
i n Dookat # HC174343 (and lub numbers thereunder), authoriting the
transportation of General Commodities betveen points in the Continental United States| and
V1EREAS, Bessor controls a aoter vehicle which i s available for
Losses'a use and suitable for transportation of the specified ootaecdities
authorised for transportation by Lessee f and
WHEREAS Lessor desires to lease such vehicle to Lessee of & longters basis and Lessee desires to lease suoh Meter vehicle froi Lessor J
HOW', 'THERSrcnS, in consideration of abnual agreeasnte and undertakings contained herein, and on the tare* and conditions expressed belpv
the parties hereto oov.mant and agree as followst
1* LEASE OfJSQUIPMENT* Lessor hereby leases to Lessee and Lessee
hereby accepts froa Use or, j^i^tractorCS) and -p- _ - _eeai.-trailer(s)
(ooUeotivly the "leased Equipnsnt") lore fully described on Exhibit "A"
attached hereto and sade a part of by reference, for the tern specified
herein, beginning ^Mjlti/alif
/6> .19<?£ .
2. EXCLUSIVE CONTROL IN LS6SEB. The Leased Equipsent i s to be
engaged exclusively in the service of the Lessee, and the goods transported therein ehall be transported pursuant to the direction of and
under exoluaive control and supervision of the Lessee*
0\'o2^
EXH!BIT E-1 of n

•"DUSTOALCOMMISS.O.M r - . T
EXHIBfTNO.

t?-/

iJK&li

-

r.w.

BW/>

ivg i

41&4 SOUTH 909 EAST
UUPRAY, UTAH M 107

AH5PORTATI0N, INC.
pue 2
3« EXCLUSIVE Com PL IN LESSEE. LeiBor ihall furnish a driver or
drivers far each unit of the Leased Equipment. Lessee shall have the coaplete care, ouatody and control of both the Leased Squipnent and driven
finished therewith) provided however that lessor shall have full aid
exoluaive responsibility for;
(A) hiring, setting the wages, hours and working condition* of and
adjusting the grievances of,supervising, training, disciplining, and firing
of a l l drivers t drivers helpers and other workers neoessary for the perforaance of Lessor's obligations under the teres of this Agreeaent, vhLoh
driver, driver's helpers and other workers are,ani shall be, either the
aaployees of the Lessor or under the direct econoelo control of the Lea serf
(B) paying all operating and related expenses far the Leased EquLprtnb,
including a l l expenses of fuel, oil and repairs to the Leased Equipnant, road
taxes, aileage taxes, fines far perking, waving or overweight violations f
licenses, permits or any other levies or assessn&ta based upon the operation of Leased Equipment, and;
(0) paying and reporting as required by an eaployerf as explained
acre fully be lew. Subject in each oase to any raquiresents which say be
placed upon Lessee by applicable statutes, and regulations proaulgatad
thereunderi I t i s understood by the parties that soae itaaa creating
the foregoing expenses Bay be arsanged far by the Lessee for LaBBar, as
expressly described b«lev, and Lessor shall reiaburse Leseee therefore
instead of paying such expenses directly, as in autually agread by the
parties fraa tiae to tiae f
4. HAIHTEHAHCB AH) CONPUAHCE REQUIREMENTS. The parties aekncwlege
that Leaflet's operations are Subject to regulation by the federal
government through the ICC and the U#S« Department of Transportation (DOT)
and by various state and looal governaents* Lesior shall have the responsibility to Leasee for compliance with sueh regulatory requirenents relating
to the operation of the Leased Equipoentj subject at a l l Uses
to verification by Lessee by)
(A) mintaining the Leased Equipment pursuant to the Agreeeant in
the mnner required by all applicable regulations!
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(B) opirating said equipsent In aooprd with-all applicable statutst
anl regulationsi
(C) providing theraunisr only those driTtri who srs qualified uaisr
a l l applioable regulations and oertified thereto by Lessee}
(D) upon mutual agreeaent between Laaaee and Lasacr» furnishing and
relinquishing to Lessee the possession) oontrel and use of the actor vehicle
which Lessee say require to fullfill requireasnts placed upon i t by applioable statuted and regulations)
(S) perforsanoc of aots necessary to ooaply vith the applioable statues
and regulations in carrying out i t s dutiss under this agree Bent.
(7} as part of i t s responsibilities hereunder, Lessor shall furnish
to Lessee a l i s t of Lessor* s qualified drivers and any supporting docwaantation relating thereto that Lessee cay, fros ties to Use, reasonably
re que at. Laaaee i s hereby granted the right to request Lessor not to use any
particular driver and, upon such request froa Leases) Lessor shall ooaply
therewith.
5« UNAUTHORIZED USB Or LSA3ftD EQUIPHBHT. Under no oireuastanoaa during
the tera of this afreeaant shall LB sacr utilise the Laaaed EquLpsamt for
the transportation of oeasoditiea vhioh Lessee i s not allowed to carry
under i t s operating authority issued by the ICO in Dookat # HC174343 (or
any other transportation for vhioh the Lessee i s not authorised under the
Act and Regulations thereunder)* The parti a a aaJmovledge that auoh unauthorised use of the Leased Eqvdpwnt say jeopardise Lesseets oontinued operations as an authorised carrier far-hire. In the event that Lessor shall
utilise the Leased Equipsent far auoh unauthorised aervioe and auoh actions
result in sanations iapoeed upon Leaaee by an/ governaental ant her i t / ,
Lessor shall b* liable %o Lessee for any and all oests and dasages, both
direct and consequential, pursuant to the provisions of 3action 11 below.
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6. TRIP DOCUMENT ATI OH TO LS3SEB. For each iniividual trip undertaken
by the Leased Bquipaent, Lessor shall furnish to Lessee, as aoon aa i s
praetical foil wing the oonpletion of said trip, tht following doouasnt*
ard informtioni
(A) Lessee's over-the road trip$eport»
(B) signed delivery receipts anl reoelpted bills of lading)
(0) current driver'a chauffer's lieense and aedieal certificate)
(D) drivers loga (properly completed as required by applicable lav
anl regulations thereucder)|
(S) sdlaage report (an exaeple of vhioh i s on trip sheet)
(F) original- fuel tickets and state fuel reportai (which are to be
exeouted in the naaa of Lessee))
(Q) oopiaa of local, state or federal inspection and violation notioee,
(H) detention tiae reoords (on a fora acceptable to Leasee asi as
specified under applicable regulations proaulgated by the ICC, i f the trip
i s coninoted under eoeaen earrisr authority))
(1) suoh FCOjtripor other vehicle inspootion report as nay be required
by the ICC or DOS
With reepaet to said inspection re porta,, lessee reserve* the right to pre**
scribe the fori on vhioh suoh inspections sxs to be reported. Said documents
and infornation My bo asseabled atd Bailed to Leasee»s principal office, at
identified, above, in an envelope provided by Leasee.
7. ROVISIOH OF VRSIOHT BILLS AM BXAWHaTIOW OF TMIITB kW aCHSPUttSt
Leaser cay exaaine the sohedulas of actual rates and charges and/or tariffs
vhioh Lesaee has filed with the ICC and froa vhioh the foregoing peroastagaa
of revenue ere deterained at Lessee* s offioes at 4154 South 300 Vest
Hurray, Ut« at any tiae during norcal buaiaess hours (8 a«a« to 5 p.a. aonday
through friday), or i f i t so sleots, the Leasor say subscribe to oopies of
said schedule s and tariffs by paying to Leasee the proper oharges therefore*
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8. DEDUCTIOH QT aUHS FCR FREIGHT LOSS trd/or DAHAOl. Lessee r e s a l e s
tha right to daduot froa any rental pays*) at dua to tha Lessor such suss
tf Lessee i s requirad to pay to any oonsignor or consignee for lots or
daaage to any ooaaodities transported by tha Laaiad Cquipaant* Pricr to aaJdng
auoh deduction, laaaaa shall furnish to Laitcr a eoapiete oopy of tha
Laaaaaia olaia fila vith eoplaa of tha documentation upon which tha
•aid claia vaa paid*
9. VARnAHTIIsa AM) 1W3SHHIHCATI0H, l a consideration of Leasee's
agrseaent to lease tha Leased Equip wot, Lessor hereby warrants, covenants
and agrees to inieanif/, dafani and hold Laaaaa her a]* as froa and against
a 11 olaies, obligations, l o s t , dacaga, penalities or sxpenasy diraot of
consequential, ineluiing without liaitation a l l costs and reasonable legal
faaa f incurved, by Lasaaa, diraotly or indiraotly, froa tha operation of tha
Leased Bqudpaant during tha tara of this agreeaant aid a l l aots er oadjaioat
of Lessor, i t s eaplcyeeS) representatives) offloars or assigns) pursuant
to tha tar as of this agraeaantt including) by way of exaapla and not of
liadtation t clataa fines, forfatures and revocations by tha ICO) the DOS
and/or any other gcvermeantal authority) and claim by third partita
for personal injury or property daaaujs*
10. 1H3URAHC8 TIEQUIHSHSHTS,
(A) It i s underatood and acknowledged by tha partiea that Laaaaa has
procured and aaintaina in f u l l faro a and a f l e e t , policies of Insurance
oorering personal injury) (Vorknen'e Compensation Insurance), property
daaage and danafa to cargo for the benefit of tha publio as required by
(9 U.S,C. 8 10927) bovaTar, for the purpose of this Agrsaaent and i n order to
Satisfy tha requiraaents of Section 9i above, the Lessor shall procure and
anintain, at i t s own expense) publio l i a b i l i t y and property daaaga insurance
fith a total ooabined single U n i t of not lass than $1,000,000 par occuraace,
ind a l l - r i s k cargo insurance vith a l i a b i l i t y l i a i t of net lass than
'50,000 par unit of Leased EqttLps»nt# Lessor and i t s insurance carrier(s)
1 ha 11, by continuing and craeaent, include Lessee on a l l such insurance
policies aa an additional insured and a hall, pricr t o the tiaa that Laaaaa
takes- poeeeeeion of Leaeed Equipment hereunier, furnish to tha Laaaaa a
ertifieate or certificates eridancing auch polieies and/or endorseaBnts«
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If, however, Lessor and i t s insurance oarritr (a) cannot provide auah
eertifloatea to LaiMa prior to the time Laiaaa takaa possession of tha
Leased Equipment hereunder, in lieu of such insurance certificates*
L«!• of and ita insurance carrier (i) may provide evidence of suoh insurance
by telegram or other for a of written- coemunication actually delivered to
Lass** prior to taking suoh posseeaion, and Lessee shall by intitled to
rely on such telegram or other for a of written communication* Not
withstanding tha foregoing, i f Lessee accept• suoh talagraphio or other
written form of evidence, Lessor and ita insurance carrier (a) shall furnish
the actual certificate cr certificates within five (5) days of tha data
of exeeution of this Lease Agreement* Prior to cancellation of, nonrenewal
of, of material ohange in such policies and/or endoraemente, or tba delation of the Leasee aa an additionally insured under auoh policies» upon
renewal cr otherwise, Lessor and i t s insurance carrier (a) shall furnish
Lessee with thirty (30) days notice in writing thereof, and Lesser1!
insurance oarritr (a) shall iniio?.te of the certificate (3) provided to
Lessee i t s (their) promise to comply with this notice provision* • Anything
in this agreement to the contrary notwithstanding! for tha purposes of the
parties to this Agreement, said insurance procured and maintained by the
Lessor under this Section shall by considered and constitute primary
insurance coverage* If any of said policies and/or endorsements are
caneell*4/Or not renewed without notification to Leesee aa required in this
Station, this Agreement shall be deemed cancelled and terminated as of
the date of suoh policy and/or endorsement cancellation or expiration*
(b) Lessor shall hate the option of aatisfying tba requirements of
Section 9 aboTe by providing insurance aa aet forth in paragraph 10(A)
or by participating in the insurance coverage program of the Least*• In
the efent Lessor eleots to satisfy the requirasnts of Section 10 above by
participating in the existing insurance prograa of Lessee, Lessor shall
give written notice to Lsssee of the exercise of said option prior to the
time Lessee takes possession of the Ltased Equipment hereunder* i f said
option i« exeroieed, Leeser expressly hereby autboriaSe leesee to deduct the
coatf-of euoh insurance for each piece of Leased Equipment oovvrmd hereby
from a>V eoniaa duo Urd owing by Lssaea to La Igor*
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1% CARE. 0U3TCDY AH3 CONTROL OF EOU^PHBHT.As provided i n S e o t i e n 3

abort, i t i s understood and acknowledged by both partite that tha exclusive
care, custody ani oontrol of the Leased Equipaent shall be in Lasses for
tha tara of thil Agreeaent* Any other provision of this Agreeaent notwithstanding, i t i s further understood and acknowledged that Lessor cannot
laase tha Leased Eqtdpnnt to any other parson or perfora actor transportation eerviea for any other person without the prior consent of Lasses*
If Lesser shall, without Lessee** prior oonsent* lease the Leased Equipaent
to to any other person or perform transportation sarTioes tharwith, Lesser
shall pay to Laseee the sua of One Hundred Dollars ($100*00) par each such
occurance as liquidated dasages far breach of this prevision* Nothing in
this Section shell be construed. however, as superceding or Modify any of
Lessor's other obligations or Lasses'i other rssediss under this Agreeaent.
(a) I t i s understood ani acknowledged by both parties that upon
violation of this provision in the Agreewnt can by iaaadiate cause for
termination of Leaaa Agree sent*
(b) I f Ussar i s asked, either by Dispatch or other authority with
Lessee, for help vith loading and Lessor i s able to procure & load* Lasses
HOST have particular load approved thru Dispatch before eoaaiting to or
loading said load* All Loads MUST BS APPROVED, booked and hi Had thru the
Salt Laka office, HO EXCEPTIONS Lessee sgrses to work on a flat ioj for all
loads that are procured thru Lessor's own effort*, providing that Lessor
handles a l l of his own advancing of aoney acd Trip-Leasing* B BftB TRANSPORTATION, INO* under no eireuiatancas, v i l l advanoe aoney on BOM one elsss
freight.
12. CHECK - IH DNDER DISPATCHt There v i l l by a HAJCATORI call-check in
before 10t00 AH Mountain TIDB each Honiay thru Friday vhile Lsssar i s under
a dispatch.rims VILL bs levied at tha rate of $50.CO per each violation
of this provision at Use of settlenanfe per each individual load that call
vaa net sade*

4154 SOUTH 300 EA91
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13. ADVAMSIK3 OH LQAD3 (FAgTRACK3)t Lasses is set up oa an sdraming
eystea oalled Fastrack. This allows ua to gits Lessor a series of nuabers
(15 digits) vcrth up to 11,000.00* Then is a charge that v i U be absorbed
by the Lessor of $3*50 per transaction* AH advances MUST be taken during
ncsraeJ. business hours (8too AM to JStoo PH, Hon-lri)* There are J4Q adraneing
Carte taken out of the offiee after hours * We hare had a problaa in the
Past with loaing ferae that hare been taken out so there will be abeolutly
no advancing ea weekends or lata at night.
14. DISPATCH (LOAD) WIHBER3 OH PAPSKVCnKt All bills Of lading, straight
b i l l a , photo-oopys, aigned delivery receipts, or freight bills turned in
far billing purposes or payment to the B B4 B Transportation office HUSI
Have either a dispatch or Pro nuaber that i s girea to Lessor at t i n of
loading, jrosantently narked and circled on each bill of lading pertaining
to that particular load« If paperwork i s turned in without a Dispatch
Kuaber, there v i l l be a deduction of $30.00 per neb* h i l l of lading that
ia net ao narked.
15. PHYSICAL pAHACE TO SQUIFHBHT.. Lessee shall have no reiponaibility
vhataoarer for loss or daaage to the Leased Equipment during the t a n of toil
^graeaont ani Lessor hereby, for itself, i t s successors and a3ri.gr* and i t s
insurers, as the oaae nay be, waivee any claias i t say bate against the
Its see for such daaage or destruction*
16* TAXED AM UHTrcRH CAB CARDS. Lssses shall furnish to Lesaer, at
ood-t, JD" Unifort Cab cards (NAflUC) and v i l l handle payaent ( to be deducted froa aettleasnt} of fuel taxes for cost of expenses thereof) the
handling, of all other taxes including but not United to, highway us*
taxes and gross ton mileage taxes, shall be the sole responsibility of the
***/Scs"«
17* CIlAnQg-BACK ITSH3 • It is understood and acknowledged that upon the
t«r-mi nation or cancellation of this agreement the Lessor shall return to
Laaaee any "D" UnLfori Cab Cards (HARUO) furniBhed far operations hereunder
a^d also shall return any and a l l signs, placards, or aarkingi, lioense
P^&tee, all licensing cards, fuel permits, hasardous t r a i t s , and anything
eiae furnished by B B k B Transportation at the tiae of Lease, I f said itaas
«r-a not returned within ten (10) days following the date of sueh termination
cr- cancellation, Leasee may deduct such costs froa any rental payaents

t&l
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wining due and payable to the Lessor* Leasee Bay alao ohargo back to
i Lessor all costs paid for fuel taxes ted aaid charge back shall be
Id by deduction fro a rental payment a due to the Leaser*
18. RESPONSIBILITY FCR COSTS, Unleaa expressly provided to the eon117 elsewhere herein, the Lessor shall be responsible far and shall pay
» cost of all fuels 1 lubricating oila* repairs• fuel taxes* eapty vilsage
raits of a l l Hnda and types (except operating authorities granted by the
3 or State Regulatory Age nolo a) t o l l s , ferries» base plates and other veb1* licenses.
19* PURCHASESfllOHLESSEE The Lessor i s not required to purchase cp
it any products• equipoent or servioet froa Lessee aa a condition for
ntering into the Agree rant*
20* TERM AH3 HOTICB. This Agreonent shall cantinue for a perihd of
Lrty one (31) days froa the date specified in Section 1 above and thereber until cancelled upon thirty (30) daya written notiee by either party*
the event notice i s to be given pursuant to any provision bf this Agree*
tit i f to Lessee, i t shall be sent, by oertified sail, postage pre-paid,
telegrai toi
B B ft B TRANSKRrATI0H I K C ,
PO Box 7061
Hurray, Ut« 64107
1, i f Lessor 1 i t shall be Bent tor

h/€,*A}' tA+s-L

*Ut4Z

flH#e f - *?*<• "™

Ltten notice shall be considered sufficient i f nailed postage prepaid,
rtified or registered nail to the above respective address* Either party
i change .such notice address at any tine by notice in writing to tba other*
21. SUBSTITUTION OF EOUIPHEHr. In the event any vehicle leased to Lasses
rsuant to this Agreenent shall, for any reason, fail to eoaplate operation
destination, lessee shall have the right to forward the Lead or azy part
ereof as nay be necessary by any weans or vehicle with the least possible
lay, and shall deduct froa any a»ount due Lessor the cost anl expense there
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22. IDENTIFICATION OF VEHICLES. Leasee shall provide all
identification required by governmental agencies to be affixed
-o the Leased Equipment, and Lessor will be required to have
company name on truck and necessary decals. Lessor ahall
promptly remove and return such identification on the termination or cancellation of this Agreement.
23. BREACH OF CONTRACT/TERMINATION. In the event either party
commits a naterial breach of any term of this Agreement, the other
party shall have the right to terminate this Agreement immediately
and hold the breaching party liable for damages occasioned by
such breach, including Attorney fees and Court coats,
24. COPIES IM VEHICLE. Lessor covenants, represents and
guarantees that a signed copy of this Agreement, or atatement aa
tuthorized by 49 C.F.R.S. 1057. 11(c) (2), ahall be carried in
each unit of the Leased Equipment at all times this Agreement is
in effect.
In witness whereof, the parties have executed this Agreement
of the day and year first above written.
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COMPENSATION SCHEDULE
Leasee will deduct as fair and equitable compensation froa
each and every shipment and/or load tranaported by virtue of
Leasee's Common Carrier Authority MC 174343 and sub-paragraphs
thereof 15* or $50,00 which ever is greater of the gross receipts.
All monies are due and payable according to the terms and conditions of the Lease Agreement. Settlements are guaranteed due to
Lessor not later than thirty (30)days after bills are received in
the office and able to forward. Payroll and settlements are
done ONCE a week, on Fridays. If Lessee is paid before the
thirty (30) days are expired, and there ia no claim of damage or
shortage or a claim of any kind, on the load, Lessor will be
Lessor will be settled on the Friday closest.

LESSEE
B'fri

Jfilrt/td

J\ ShtiO

LESSORIX /77*~%A Z2tt~>utJ*;

B TRANSPORTATION,INC

DATE ^i& dlttftur

/&^ >Cf9b

DATE*

J3L- /{-
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35-1-42

LABOR — INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION

writing, good and sufficient reasons for such failure. The commission may
require the information herein required to be furnished to be made under oath
and returned to the commission within the period fixed by it or by law. The
commission, or any member thereof, or any person employed by the commission for that purpose, shall have the right to examine, under oath, any employer, his agents or employees, for the purpose of ascertaining any information which such employer is required by this title to furnish to the commission. Any employer who, within a reasonable time to be fixed by the commission and after the receipt of written notice signed by at least two members of
the commission specifying the information demanded and served by registered mail, refuses to furnish to the commission the annual statement herein
required, or who refuses to furnish such other information as may be required
by the commission under authority of this section, or who willfully furnishes a
false or untrue statement shall be liable to" a penalty of not to exceed $500 for
each offense to be recovered in a civil action brought by and in the name of the
commission. All such penalties when collected shall be paid into the combined
injury benefit fund.
History: L. 1917, ch. 100, § 34; C.L. 1917,
§ 3094; L. 1921, ch. 67, § 1; R.S. 1933,

42-1-39; L. 1939, ch. 51, § 1; C. 1943, 42-1-39;
L. 1945, ch. 65, § 1; 1977, ch. 156, § 2.

NOTES TO DECISIONS
ANALYSIS

Determination of identity of employer.
Foreign employer.
Determination of identity of employer.
The determination of who is the employer,
and who owned the business, in the employ of
which the employee was injured, if a material
issue in the case, must be determined by the
commission and on the basis of competent evidence before it. Putnam v. Industrial Comm'n,
80 Utah 187, 14 P.2d 973 (1932).

Foreign employer.
The Legislature in using the word "employer" in this section had in mind only those
employers whose employees are regularly employed, plus, perhaps, under § 35-1-54, those
hired here. United Airlines Transp. Corp. v.
Industrial Comm'n, 110 Utah 590, 175 P.2d
752 (1946).

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
C.J.S. — 100 C.J.S. Workmen's Compensation § 384.

Key Numbers. — Workers' Compensation
«=» 1090.

35-1-42. Employers enumerated and defined — Regularly
employed — Statutory employers.
(1) The state, and each county, city, town, and school district in the state
are considered employers under this title.
(2) Except as provided in Subsection (3), each person, including each public
utility and each independent contractor, who regularly employs one or more
workers or operatives in the same business, or in or about the same establishment, under any contract of hire, express or implied, oral or written is considered an employer under this title. As used in this subsection:
140
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(a) "Regularly" includes all employments in the usual course of the
trade, business, profession, or occupation of the employer, whether continuous throughout the year or for only a portion of the year.
(b) "Independent contractor" means any person engaged in the performance of any work for another who, while so engaged, is independent of
the employer in all that pertains to the execution of the work, is not
subject to the rule or control of the employer, is engaged only in the
performance of a definite job or piece of work, and is subordinate to the
employer only in effecting a result in accordance with the employer's
design.
(3) (a) An agricultural employer is not considered an employer under this
title if:
(i) his employees are all members of his immediate family and he
has a proprietary interest in the farm where they work; or
(ii) he employed five or fewer persons other than immediate family
members for 40 hours or more per week per employee for 13 consecutive weeks during any part of the preceding 12 months,
(b) A domestic employer who does not employ one employee or more
than one employee at least 40 hours per week is not considered an employer under this title.
(4) An employer of agricultural laborers or domestic servants who is not
under this title has the right and option to come under it by complying with
its provisions and the rules of the commission.
(5) (a) If any person who is an employer procures any work to be done
wholly or in part for him by a contractor over whose work he retains
supervision or control, and this work is a part or process in the trade or
business of the employer, the contractor, all persons employed by him, all
subcontractors under him, and all persons employed by any of these subcontractors, are considered employees of the original employer.
(b) A general contractor may not be considered to have retained supervision or control over the work of a subcontractor solely because of the
customary trade relationship between general contractors and subcontractors.
(c) A portion of a construction project subcontracted to others may be
considered to be a part or process in the trade or business of the general
building contractor, only if the general building contractor, without regard to whether or not it would need additional employees, would perform
the work in the normal course of its trade or business.
(d) Any person who is engaged in constructing, improving, repairing,
or remodelling a residence that he owns or is in the process of acquiring
as his personal residence may not be considered an employee or employer
solely by operation of Subsection (a).
(e) A partner in a partnership or an owner of a sole proprietorship may
not be considered an employee under Subsection (a) if:
(i) the person is not included as an employee under Subsection
35-1-43 (3) (a); or
(ii) the person is included as an employee under Subsection
35-1-43 (3) (a), but his employer fails to insure or otherwise provide
adequate payment of direct compensation, which failure is attributable to an act or omission over which the person had or shared control
or responsibility.
141
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(f) For purposes of Subsection (e) (ii):
(i) a partner of a partnership and an owner of a sole proprietorship
are presumed to have had or shared control or responsibility for any
failure to insure or otherwise provide adequate payment of direct
compensation, the burden of proof being on any person seeking to
establish the contrary; and
(ii) evidence affirmatively establishing that a partner of a partnership or an owner of a sole proprietorship had or shared control or
responsibility for any failure to insure or otherwise provide adequate
payment of direct compensation may only be overcome by clear and
convincing evidence to the contrary.
(g) A director or officer of a corporation may not be considered an employee under Subsection (a) if the director or officer is excluded from
coverage under Subsection 35-1-43 (3) (b).
History: L. 1917, ch. 100, § 50; C.L. 1917,
§ 3110; L. 1919, ch. 63, § 1; R.S. 1933,
42-1-40; L. 1939, ch. 51, § 1; C. 1943, 42-1-40;
L. 1949, ch. 52, § 1; 1975, ch. 101, § 1; 1983,
ch. 355, § 1; 1986, ch. 211, § 3; 1988, ch. 109,
§ 1.
Amendment Notes. — The 1986 amendment, effective July 1, 1986, deleted "shall" in
the introductory language and made a stylistic
change in Subsection (1); redesignated the introductory language of Subsection (2) as Subsection (2)(a), deleted "private" before "corporation" and made stylistic changes in Subsection (2)(a); subdivided the section following
"except" into Subsections (2)(a)(i) and (2)(a)(ii);
redesignated Subsections (2)(a) and (2)(b) as
(2)(a)(i)(A) and (2)(a)(i)(B), redesignated the
second sentence as Subsection (2)(b;; designated the third sentence as Subsections (3) and
(3)(a); designated the fourth sentence as Subsection (3) and (3)(a); designated the fourth
sentence as Subsection (3)(b); designated the
fifth sentence as Subsection (3)(c); designated
the sixth sentence as Subsection (3)(d); deleted
"who meet any one of the following conditions"
following "employers" in Subsection (2)(a)(i);
deleted "provided that" before "the inclusion"
and made minor word changes in Subsections
(2)(a)(i)(A) and (2)(a)(i)(B); substituted a period
for "provided that employers" following "week"
in Subsection (2)(a)(ii); deleted "and regulations" following "rules" and made stylistic
changes in Subsection (2)(b); substituted "As
used in this section" for "The term 'regularly'
as herein used shall include" at the beginning
of Subsection (3); inserted "'Regularly' includes" at the beginning of Subsection (3)(a);
substituted "are considered" for "shall be
deemed, within the meaning of this section"
and made minor word changes in Subsection

(3)(b); and made stylistic changes in Subsections (3)(c) and (3)(d).
The 1988 amendment, effective April 25,
1988, deleted the introductory language, which
read 'The following constitute employers subject to the provisions of this title"; added "are
considered employers under this title" at the
end of Subsection (1); redesignated the former
introductory paragraph of Subsection (2)(a) as
the present introductory paragraph of Subsection (2) and, in that paragraph, added the second sentence and rewrote the first sentence;
redesignated former Subsections (3)(a) and
(3)(d) as present Subsections (2)(a) and (2)(b);
deleted "association, or corporation" following
"person" in Subsection (2)(b); restructured former Subsection (2)(a)(i) as present Subsection
(3)(a), rewriting the contents thereof; redesignated former Subsection (2)(a)(ii) as present
Subsection (3)(b), rewriting the contents
thereof, which read "domestic employers who
do not employ one employee or more than one
employee at least 40 hours per week"; redesignated former Subsection (2)(b) as present Subsection (4), rewriting the contents thereof,
which read "Employers of agricultural laborers
and domestic servants have the right to come
under the terms of this title by complying with
the provisions of this title and the rules of the
commission"; deleted the former introductory
language of former Subsection (3), which read
"As used in this section"; redesignated former
Subsection (3)(b) as present Subsection (5)(a),
substituting therein "If any person who is an"
for "Where any"; deleted former Subsection
(3)(c), which read "Any person, firm, or corporation engaged in the performance of work as
an independent contractor is considered an employer"; and added Subsections (5)(b) through
(5)(g).
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NOTES TO DECISIONS
ANALYSIS

Agricultural laborers and domestic servants.
Bringing excepted employees under act.
Construction and application.
Contractor employees.
Contractor or subcontractor as employer.
"Definite job" test.
Determination of nature of business.
Employee and independent contractor.
Express company.
Firm.
Foreign corporation.
Independent contractor.
Judicial review.
Jurisdiction.
Jurisdictional question.
Operation and effect.
Question on appeal.
Regular employment.
Relationship of employer and employee.
Right of employer to come under act.
School district.
Statutory employer.
—"Sufficient control."
Subcontractor an employee.
—Employee of subcontractor.
Subcontractor's employee.
Supervision.
Tests and determinative factors.
Cited.
Agricultural laborers and domestic servants.
One employed by co-operative owners of
threshing machine to thresh crop was an "agricultural laborer" within Workmen's Compensation Act. Jones v. Industrial Comm'n, 55
Utah 489, 187 P. 833 (1920).
Sheepherder is included within term "agricultural laborers" as used in this section and,
hence, not entitled to compensation for injuries. Davis v. Industrial Comm'n, 59 Utah 607,
206 P. 267 (1922).
Where employer conducts both industrial
and agricultural enterprises, death of employee while engaged in latter work is not compensable notwithstanding he might have done
industrial work after farm work was completed, and notwithstanding employer used
farm produce to feed animals employed in its
industrial enterprise. Ocean Accident & Guarantee Co. v. Industrial Comm'n, 69 Utah 473,
256 P. 405 (1926).
Farm laborers and domestic servants, having been excepted from the provisions of the
act (§ 35-1-1 et seq.), are left in the same situation they would have been in had the act not
been passed. Murray v. Strike, 76 Utah 118,
287 P. 922 (1930).

A housekeeper is to be classed as a "domestic
servant" within the meaning of that term as
used in this section, but those and other excepted employees may be brought within the
act by compliance on part of employer with requirements of its provisions. Murray v. Strike,
76 Utah 118, 287 P. 922 (1930).
Employee injured by falling off hay to be
used to feed horses in connection with operation of brick plant is doing work incidental to
his employment with brick plant and not in
agricultural occupation. Harding v. Industrial
Comm'n, 83 Utah 376, 28 P.2d 182, 91 A.L.R.
1523 (1934).
Bringing excepted employees under act.
The statute requires an employer of excepted
employees to meet the following requirements
in order to bring himself and such employees
within provisions of act: (1) Secure insurance
and keep insured as required by § 35-1-46; (2)
file notice of his insurance together with copy
of the policy with the Industrial Commission as
required by § 35-1-47; and (3) post typewritten
or printed notices on or about the premises
showing that he has complied with the law, as
required by § 35-1-56. This option is not extended to the employee, but if employer exer-

143

35-1-42

LABOR — INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION

cises his option then employee thereby loses
the right to pursue his common-law remedies.
Murray v. Strike, 76 Utah 118, 287 P. 922
(1930).
A housekeeper is to be classed as a "domestic
servant." But excepted employees may be
brought within the act (§ 35-1-1 et seq.) by
compliance with its provisions. Murray v.
Strike, 76 Utah 118, 287 P. 922 (1930).
Construction and application.
The definitions in this section control in so
far as they may tend to modify the common law
of master and servant. Murray v. Wasatch
Grading Co., 73 Utah 430, 274 P. 940 (1929).
The term "employer" is broad enough to
cover all employment relationships. Ortega v.
Salt Lake Wet Wash Laundry, 108 Utah 1,156
P.2d 885 (1945).
Subsection (5)(a) should be construed in favor of protecting the employee. Bennett v. Industrial Comm'n, 726 P.2d 427 (Utah 1986).
Contractor employees.
The cleaning of oil storage tanks was a part
or process in the business of an oil refining
company, and the company was the employer
of a contractor's employee's engaged to clean
the tanks. Lee v. Chevron Oil Co., 565 P.2d
1128 (Utah 1977).
Contractor or subcontractor as employer.
Where contractor who was not subject to this
act prior to 1949 amendment inasmuch as he
never employed more than two men, and who
was under primary obligation to county to
paint roof of courthouse and jail, contracted
with subcontractor, who was subject to act because he employed as many as twenty men,
that latter furnish labor and equipment for job
and contractor would furnish paint therefor;
but, as subcontractor was unable to finish job
because of other work, contractor sent his two
employees to do so pursuant to understanding
between contractor and subcontractor that latter would pay former's men therefor, and one of
them while working thereon was fatally injured whereupon subcontractor paid contractor
for his time and thereafter completed job, injured employee at time of accident was employee of the subcontractor within meaning of
this act. Rosenbaum v. Industrial Comm'n, 112
Utah 109, 185 P.2d 511 (1947).
"Definite job" test
The "definite job" test is not helpful unless it
is taken in connection with other factors or
limited to jobs such as are usually done by outside parties in pursuance of their independent
callings, such as construction of buildings or
some job not in the line of the employer's business, but something which he finds necessary
or desirable in the furtherance of his business.
Parkinson v. Industrial Comm'n, 110 Utah
309, 172 P.2d 136 (1946).

Determination of nature of business.
General business of employer is controlling
factor in determining nature of employment
and right to compensation; where carpenter's
helper, employed by ranch company to build
house on ranch for manager, was injured while
assisting in carrying groceries into house pursuant to request, he was not entitled to compensation, since ranch company was engaged
in industrial labor and was not also engaged in
the construction business; such construction
was merely incidental to its farming business.
Anderson v. Last Chance Ranch Co., 63 Utah
551, 228 P. 184 (1924).
Employee and independent contractor.
Agent can be "employee" for limited purpose
and "independent contractor" for other purposes. Christean v. Industrial Comm'n, 113
Utah 451, 196 P.2d 502 (1948).
Subcontractor, who was both owner and employee of his business, was considered employee of general contractor for workers' compensation purposes where metal work done by
subcontractor was part of process in general
contractor's business, and where general contractor had substantial right, under the arrangement, to control the subcontractor's
work. Pinter Constr. Co. v. Frisby, 678 P.2d
305 (Utah 1984).
Express company.
Express company is not common carrier by
railroad within Federal Employers' Liability
Act, but comes within Workmen's Compensation Act. State ex rel. Bennett v. American Express Co., 57 Utah 405, 195 P. 312 (1921).
Firm.
The term "firm" as used in this section includes a partnership. Berger v. Minnesota
Mut. Life Ins. Co., 723 P.2d 388 (Utah
1986)(decided prior to 1988 amendment).
Foreign corporation.
Stipulation that employer had three or more
employees on date of injury, and that it had not
procured workmen's compensation insurance
to cover its Utah employees, was sufficient to
support finding that employer was subject to
provisions of Utah act, where employer was a
foreign corporation licensed to do business in
Utah. Buckingham Transp. Co. v. Industrial
Comm'n, 93 Utah 342, 72 P.2d 1077 (1937).
Independent contractor.
An independent contractor is one who exercises independent employment, and contracts
to do piece of work by his own methods without
being subject to employer's control except as to
result of work. Strieker v. Industrial Comm'n,
55 Utah 603,188 P. 849,19 A.L.R. 1159 (1920).
Where deceased, who was hired as quarry
worker to drill, load and shoot holes, acted on
own judgment as to manner of prosecuting
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work, was free from any control from employer
and assumed all risks of accident, he was an
independent contractor within meaning of
Compensation Act (§ 35-1-1 et seq.). Strieker
v. Industrial Comm'n, 55 Utah 603,188 P. 849,
19 A.L.R. 1159 (1920).
An independent contractor is one who is under contract to render service or do work for
another according to his own method, means,
and manner of doing the work and without being subject to the control, direction, or supervision of such other, except as to the result of the
work or service. Strieker v. Industrial Comm'n,
55 Utah 603,188 P. 849,19 A.L.R. 1159 (1920).
Claimant who contracted to pour cement for
construction of apartment building charging
certain amount per cubic foot and who hired
his own help, was an independent contractor
and not an employee. Angel v. Industrial
Comm'n, 64 Utah 105, 228 P. 509 (1924).
In proceeding for compensation for death of
driver of automobile truck transporting children to school, where employer of driver was
independent contractor, deceased was not entitled to compensation. Ludlow v. Industrial
Comm'n, 65 Utah 168, 235 P. 884 (1925).
Under this section, men hiring out themselves together with their teams to a road contractor, and who worked as laborers and teamsters under supervision of superintendent, and
who were paid in yardage, were employees and
not independent contractors. Columbia Cas.
Co. v. Industrial Comm'n, 74 Utah 597, 281 P.
198 (1929).
Partnership engaged in hauling gravel made
agreement with partnership engaged in building contracting whereby former was to dig
foundation of building for specific sum and
haul gravel at specified price per load; partners
engaged in hauling gravel were independent
contractors so partnership engaged in building
contracting was not employer and not liable for
death of partner while hauling gravel under
Workmen's Compensation Act. Gibson v. Industrial Comm'n, 81 Utah 580, 21 P.2d 536
(1933).
Where truck driver was killed while delivering gravel from gravel company's pit to site
where hospital was being constructed, and
gravel company had refused to contract with
truck owner but permitted him to put his truck
into service at agreed rate of compensation,
and such owner employed driver, driver was
not employee of gravel company but was independent contractor. Luker Sand & Gravel Co.
v. Industrial Comm'n, 82 Utah 188, 23 P.2d
225 (1933).
Where subcontractor was an independent
contractor, contractor was not liable to pay
compensation to subcontractor's employee; although contract between contractor and subcontractor provided that work was to be done

35-1-42

as directed by contractor, subcontractor was to
furnish bond to protect contractor from compensation claims, and contractor had right to
object to workmen employed by subcontractor.
Murch Bros. Constr. Co. v. Industrial Comm'n,
84 Utah 494, 36 P.2d 1053 (1934).
Evidence that employer retained control and
supervision over truck drivers furnished along
with trucks by independent contractor under
oral contract in which contractor agreed to
make all deliveries for employer, sustained
award of compensation for driver injured in
course of his employment as an employee of
employer within meaning of this section. Utah
Fire Clay Co. v. Industrial Comm'n, 86 Utah 1,
40 P.2d 183 (1935).
Bedding company salesman who received no
instruction as to place, time or manner of
work, furnished own means of transportation,
paid own expenses, was not subject to company's control over movements or mode of doing work, and was given an allowance based on
amount of sales by way of compensation for his
services, was an independent contractor and
not an employee of company, and his death was
not compensable. Stover Bedding Co. v. Industrial Comm'n, 99 Utah 423,107 P.2d 1027,134
A.L.R. 1006 (1940).
Driver of loaded gravel truck was an independent contractor. Kinder v. Industrial
Comm'n, 106 Utah 448, 150 P.2d 109 (1944).
Although obtaining coke was a necessary
condition for carrying on employer's business,
yet where such employer was not in trucking
business, nor in business of selling coke, the
hauling of coke was not "a part or process in
the trade or business of the employer" within
the meaning of this section, and trucker's relationship was held that of independent contractor and not employer-employee. Parkinson v.
Industrial Comm'n, 110 Utah 309, 172 P.2d
136 (1946).
Licensed plumber who orally contracted with
contractor, who was engaged in building apartment house for himself, to lay pipe in trench
for $1.00 per foot for purpose of connecting
with city sewer, pursuant to city requirement
that a licensed plumber do pipe laying, was
properly found by Industrial Commission to be
independent contractor and not employee so as
to preclude compensation for plumber's death
while laying pipe as result of cave-in; where
contractor did not exercise or intend to exercise
any supervisory control over plumber and did
not carry him on payroll as employee, and
plumber employed and paid his assistants and
furnished necessary tools and equipment, even
though plumber did not maintain regular
plumbing shop, and notwithstanding that he
voluntarily aided in backfilling and pipe
blinding. Ewer v. Industrial Comm'n, 112
Utah 538, 189 P.2d 959 (1948).
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While present social concepts may dictate
that commission salesmen should be considered employees rather than independent contractors so as to be covered by Workmen's
Compensation Act; in view of development of
Utah law and numerous decisions of Supreme
Court over period of years, it is for Legislature,
rather than court, to accomplish such change.
Christean v. Industrial Comm'n, 113 Utah 451,
196 P.2d 502 (1948).
Insurance salesman was properly found by
industrial commission to have been "independent contractor," and not "employee," when
killed as result of collision while en route in his
car for purpose of soliciting insurance, so as to
preclude compensation, where contract between salesman and insurance company provided that relationship should be that of independent contractor, and control that company
could exercise thereunder consisted in limiting
salesman's right to bind company contractually and of right to control results of his work,
and did not go to extent of directing how work
should be done, even though he was receiving a
salary incident to a refresher course after return from military service. Christean v. Industrial Comm'n, 113 Utah 451, 196 P.2d 502
(1948).
Where owner of building engaged plaintiff
and another to make repairs thereto and, while
owner was charged union scale of wages for
carpenters and furnished materials, owner
merely showed them what work she wanted
done and left it entirely up to them as to
method or manner of accomplishing desired result, and plaintiff and other person determined
what materials should be used and what quantity would be necessary, and furnished their
own tools, preponderance of evidence established absence of right of control on part of
owner, and therefore, plaintiff was "independent contractor," and not" employee," and precluded from compensation for injuries sustained while doing repair work on building.
Sommerville v. Industrial Comm'n, 113 Utah
504, 196 P.2d 718 (1948).
There was sufficient evidence to sustain
commission's finding that a construction company retained supervision and control over
work done by shinglers and was thus the employer of a person employed by the shinglers
within the meaning of this section. Plewe
Constr. Co. v. Industrial Comm'n, 121 Utah
375, 242 P.2d 561 (1952).
There was sufficient evidence to support
finding that plaintiff was an employee for
workmen's compensation purposes where it
was shown that the claimant was hired by the
company to provide and operate a drilling rig
and crew for drilling and sampling soil and
where, although company did not carry him on
their books nor withhold income tax or social

security, the company kept a supervisor on the
job who was there 95% of the time and exercised close supervision. Maryland Cas. Co. v.
Industrial Comm'n, 12 Utah 2d 223, 364 P.2d
1020 (1961).
Where workers' compensation claimant was
injured while installing roof for general contractor, it was not arbitrary or capricious to
deny benefits on the ground that claimant was
a self-employed contractor, even though general contractor furnished materials and directed claimant to some extent with regard to
the manner of installation. Graham v. R.
Thorne Found., 675 P.2d 1196 (Utah 1983).
Subcontractor, who was both owner and employee of his business, was considered employee of general contractor for workers' compensation purposes where metal work done by
subcontractor was part of process in general
contractor's business, and where general contractor had substantial right, under the arrangement, to control the subcontractor's
work. Pinter Constr. Co. v. Frisby, 678 P.2d
305 (Utah 1984).
Judicial review.
Question, prior to 1949 amendment, whether
there were more than two employees in service
of employer when injury occurred presented
question of jurisdiction as to which it became
duty of Supreme Court to judicially review and
determine facts as well as law. Hardman v.
Industrial Comm'n, 60 Utah 203, 207 P. 460
(1922).
Under this section, prior to 1949 amendment, "the evidence must be sufficient to reasonably justify a finding that the employer at
the time of the accident had in his 'service
three or more workmen or operatives regularly
employed in the same business, or in or about
the same establishment."' Buhler v. Maddison,
105 Utah 39, 140 P.2d 933 (1943).
Jurisdiction.
Industrial Commission having arrived at
conclusion, prior to 1949 amendment, that
there were only two employees engaged in service of employer at time injury occurred, commission was not justified in proceeding further
than to deny application for want of jurisdiction. Hardman v. Industrial Comm'n, 60 Utah
203, 207 P. 460 (1922).
Jurisdictional question.
Whether or not one engaged in service for
another is an employee or an independent contractor is a jurisdictional question presenting a
situation which requires Supreme Court to determine status from facts submitted, from a
preponderance of the evidence, and apply the
facts so found to the law of the case. Luker
Sand & Gravel Co. v. Industrial Comm'n, 82
Utah 188, 23 P.2d 225 (1983); Parkinson v. Industrial Comm'n, 110 Utah 309, 172 P.2d 136
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(1946); Sommerville v. Industrial Comm'n, 113
Utah 504, 196 P.2d 718 (1948).
Question being jurisdictional, Supreme
Court on appeal is required to examine evidence to determine whether it preponderates
against conclusions of industrial commission.
Christean v. Industrial Comm'n, 113 Utah 451,
196 P.2d 502 (1948).
Operation and effect
This section, prior to 1949 amendment, divided employers into two classes—those upon
whom the provisions of the act were mandatory, and those upon whom the provisions of
the act were optional. The optional group included employers of agricultural and domestic
laborers and employers having less than three
persons regularly employed. The mandatory
group included the state and each county, city,
town and school district therein, and every person, firm, or corporation having in service
three or more employees regularly employed,
except the optional groups. Ortega v. Salt Lake
Wet Wash Laundry, 108 Utah 1, 156 P.2d 885
(1945).
Question on appeal.
Where evidence is largely uncontradicted,
problem on appeal in determining whether one
was "employee" or "independent contractor" is
not so much one of examining record to determine whether evidence preponderates for or
against conclusion of commission, but rather of
determining whether commission drew correct
legal conclusion therefrom. Sommerville v. Industrial Comm'n, 113 Utah 504, 196 P.2d 718
(1948).
Regular employment
The term "regularly" connotes usually, systematically, methodically. It is not synonymous with "continuous" or "continuously" or
"occasionally." Palle v. Industrial Comm'n, 79
Utah 47, 7 P.2d 284, 81 A.L.R. 1222 (1932).
The employment of one to take the place of a
regular employee while absent may not be said
to constitute a mere "casual" employment, but
is a regular employment in the business. Palle
v. Industrial Comm'n, 79 Utah 47, 7 P.2d 284,
81 A.L.R. 1222 (1932).
The word "regularly" in this section was intended to include all employments, regular, casual, or occasional, in the usual trade or business of the employer. In other words, to bring
the employer within the act, the number of
men employed was to be determined by the
character of the work in which they were employed, however brief or long, and not by the
character of the employment, whether regular,
casual, occasional, periodical or otherwise, so
long as they were hired and engaged to do
work in the common or usual business of the
employer. Palle v. Industrial Comm'n, 79 Utah
47, 7 P.2d 284, 81 A.L.R. 1222 (1932).
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Relationship of employer and employee.
Relationship of employer and employee may
be established by agreement. Burke v. Industrial Comm'n, 75 Utah 441, 286 P. 623 (1929).
Test of employment relationship is whether
employer retains supervision and control of
work to be performed, and this rule is not limited in its application to cases involving distinction between employee and independent
contractor. Weber County-Ogden City Relief
Comm. v. Industrial Comm'n, 93 Utah 85, 71
P.2d 177 (1937).
A person employed under written contract to
set up a set of books, but who was not required
to do any of the work at the plant, nor be there
at any time or at all, was not an employee. "It
was a contract for an independent piece of
work, free from control of the company." When
the set of books was set up, that was the end of
the matter. Overman v. Industrial Comm'n,
103 Utah 468, 136 P.2d 945 (1943).
Fundamental test of employer-employee relationship is right of control. Auerbach Co. v.
Industrial Comm'n, 113 Utah 347, 195 P.2d
245 (1948).
Where parties in good faith contract as to
status and such understanding is not contrary
to law, intent of parties as set forth in such
contract may be considered as element in determining relationship of parties, and may be
given weight by industrial commission and Supreme Court. Christean v. Industrial Comm'n,
113 Utah 451, 196 P.2d 502 (1948).
A book salesman who, at the time of the accident, was working under a written agreement
of employment whereby he was to give his entire time to sale of the company's publications,
making sales in manner and territory indicated by the company, for which he was to be
paid commission on a weekly basis for books
that he sold, from which social security, payroll, and withholding taxes were to be deducted, was an employee of the company
within the meaning of this statute. Nicholson
v. Industrial Comm'n, 14 Utah 2d 3, 376 P.2d
386 (1962).
Where "independent contractor" had no
choice of the terms of his truck lease, drove a
truck owned by lessor, hauled only loads that
had been approved by his supervisor, was not
free to refuse a load, was obliged to travel a
certain route, and operate a certain number of
miles per month at a specified speed, there was
reasonable basis for conclusion of the Industrial Commission that plaintiff was an employee within the meaning of the workmen's
compensation statute. Harry L. Young & Sons,
Inc. v. Ashton, 538 P.2d 316 (Utah 1975).
Evidence showing that claimant was an experienced drywall installer associated with an
independent business; that plaintiff lodge contacted the business concerning installation of
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drywall on its premises; that the business was
not interested, but plaintiff and claimant individually agreed that claimant would do the
work for a specified hourly rate; that under the
terms of the agreement claimant was to furnish his own special tools and plaintiff was to
furnish him with a ladder and protective drop
cloth; that plaintiff employed a "handyman
crew" to conduct maintenance and repair work
for it; that before beginning work claimant was
"taken over the entire job," shown what services were to be performed, shown where to
stack the drywall and told not to damage the
floor; and that he was not allowed to begin
work at his first appearance was sufficient to
support a finding that claimant was plaintiffs
employee, and the commission did not abuse its
discretion in awarding compensation for injuries sustained when claimant suffered a fall
while working at the lodge. Rustler Lodge v.
Industrial Comm'n, 562 P.2d 227 (Utah 1977).
A truck driver who took a tractor home in
order to service and clean it was an employee
of the truck's owner as well as the lessee of the
truck. Kinne v. Industrial Comm'n, 609 P.2d
926 (Utah 1980).
Where workers' compensation claimant was
injured while installing roof for general contractor, it was not arbitrary or capricious to
deny benefits on the ground that claimant was
a self-employed contractor, even though general contractor furnished materials and directed claimant to some extent with regard to
the manner of installation. Graham v. R.
Thorne Found., 675 P.2d 1196 (Utah 1983).
Right of employer to come under a c t
As an employer of agricultural laborers and
domestic servants is free to come under or stay
out of the Workmen's Compensation Act, he
may accept as to one class of employees and not
as to another. Murray v. Strike, 76 Utah 118,
287 P. 922 (1930).
School district.
While Workmen's Compensation Act merely
requires school districts to pay compensation
provided for in act, and does not provide how
funds to pay compensation shall be raised, that
standing alone would not necessarily relieve
school district from power or duty of paying
compensation awarded. Woodcock v. Board of
Educ, 55 Utah 458, 187 P. 181, 10 A.L.R. 181
(1920).
School district represented by board of education was liable to schoolteacher sustaining
personal injuries in course of her employment
for amount awarded to her by industrial commission, and such amount was payable out of
funds raised by taxation for support and maintenance of schools. Woodcock v. Board of Educ,
55 Utah 458,187 P. 181,10 A.L.R. 181 (1920).

Statutory employer.
—"Sufficient control."
Where joint owners of interest in oil and gas
leases provided for construction of a gas processing plant located in Utah, to be operated as
a "mutually profitable venture" for the purpose
of extracting liquid hydrocarbons, and under
the operating agreement the owners reserved
the power of ultimate control over the project
and over the operator thereof, the owners retained "sufficient control" to qualify as statutory employers of an employee of the operator
pursuant to Subsection (2) and the exclusive
remedy provision of § 35-1-60 applied. Lamb v.
W-Energy, Inc., 663 F. Supp. 395 (D. Utah
1987).
Subcontractor an employee.
Subcontractor was employee of general contractor within meaning of statute in light of
evidence that general contractor had full control over subcontractor's truck and driver, that
work done by subcontractor and truck was the
work being performed by general contractor;
that general contractor paid subcontractor by
the hour for use of truck and the driver, and
that general contractor directed and supervised subcontractor in hauling and dumping
dirt for general contactor. Result was not affected by fact that general contractor did not
list driver of truck on its payroll and made no
deductions from truck rental for Social Security, income taxes or union dues and did not
issue W-2 payroll form to driver of truck at the
end of year; since subcontractor was employee
of contractor, other employee of contractor who
was negligently injured by subcontractor could
not maintain tort action against subcontractor.
Gallegos v. Stringham, 21 Utah 2d 139, 442
P.2d 31 (1968).
Subcontractor, who was both owner and employee of his business, was considered employee of general contractor for workers' compensation purposes where metal work done by
subcontractor was part of process in general
contractor's business, and where general contractor had substantial right, under the arrangement, to control the subcontractor's
work. Pinter Constr. Co. v. Frisby, 678 P.2d
305 (Utah 1984).
As long as a subcontractor's work is a part or
process of the general contractor's business, an
inference arises that the general contractor
has retained supervision or control over the
subcontractor sufficient to meet the requirement of this section. Bennett v. Industrial
Comm'n, 726 P.2d 427 (Utah 1986).
Claimant, who had been terminated by a
construction company, was nonetheless an employee in regard to a remodeling job he subsequently undertook, where, although he had
opened a "company" bank account with the intention of becoming an independent contractor,

148

WORKERS' COMPENSATION
his relationship with his former employer had
not changed, except for the fact that payroll
deductions were not made for him. Bennett v.
Industrial Comm'n, 726 P.2d 427 (Utah 1986).
—Employee of subcontractor.
General contractor was the statutory employer of an injured carpenter's helper employed by a subcontractor, where the general
contractor's trade or business was the total
project — the construction of a residential addition — and carpentry work was integral to
the project, which could not have been completed without carpenters. Jacobsen v. Industrial Comm'n, 738 P.2d 658 (Utah Ct. App.
1987).
Subcontractor's employee.
Masonry work was a part or process of the
trade or business of the building contractor,
thus making masonry subcontractor's employee an employee of the general contractor
under this section. Smith v. Alfred Brown Co.,
27 Utah 2d 155, 493 P.2d 994 (1972).
Supervision.
When employer retains supervision and control of the work to be performed, the workmen
under him are employees. Luker Sand &
Gravel Co. v. Industrial Comm'n, 82 Utah 188,
23 P.2d 225 (1933).
Tests and determinative factors.
Whether person is independent contractor or
employee must be determined from contract itself, and actual interference with work is unnecessary, since it is the right to interfere that
determines relationship. Ludlow v. Industrial
Comm'n, 65 Utah 168, 235 P. 884 (1925).
Another or additional test approved by Supreme Court is that one is an independent contractor when he can employ others to do the
work and accomplish the contemplated result
without the consent of the contractee. Gogoff v.
Industrial Comm'n, 77 Utah 355, 296 P. 229
(1931).
Test whether employer retains supervision
over work of contractor so as to make contractor and his employees under this section employees of employer is whether employer has
right of supervision whether he exercises such
right or not. Utah Fire Clay Co. v. Industrial
Comm'n, 86 Utah 1, 40 P.2d 183 (1935).

35-1-42

While it is true that manner and basis of
payment of compensation is one element to be
considered in determining whether claimant is
employee or independent contractor, it is by no
means conclusive. Stover Bedding Co. v. Industrial Comm'n, 99 Utah 423,107 P.2d 1027,134
A.L.R. 1006 (1940).
Whether a workman is an "employee" or an
"independent contractor" is dependent on (1)
whether the employer has the right to control
his execution of the work, (2) whether the work
done or to be done is a part or process in the
trade or business of the employer, and (3)
whether the work done or to be done is a definite job or piece of work. Parkinson v. Industrial Comm'n, 110 Utah 309, 172 P.2d 136
(1946); Ewer v. Industrial Comm'n, 112 Utah
538, 189 P.2d 959.
The most important of the determinatives of
the relationship between workman and employer is that of control. The existence of a potential right to control is sufficient to create
the relationship even though that right is
never exercised. Parkinson v. Industrial
Comm'n, 110 Utah 309, 172 P.2d 136 (1946).
Extent of control is the important test in determining status of one as "employee" or "independent contractor," under this section.
Christean v. Industrial Comm'n, 113 Utah 451,
196 P.2d 502 (1948).
"Independent calling" or "own business" test
is not followed in Utah. Christean v. Industrial
Comm'n, 113 Utah 451, 196 P.2d 502 (1948).
Crucial factor in determining whether applicant for workmen's compensation is "employee" or "independent contractor" is whether
person for whom services were performed had
right to control execution of work. Sommerville
v. Industrial Comm'n, 113 Utah 504, 196 P.2d
718 (1948).
In determining who is the employer of an
employee, the right to control the employee's
work is dispositive of the question; the degree
of control actually exercised need not be great,
so long as the right exists. Bambrough v.
Bethers, 552 P.2d 1286 (Utah 1976).
Cited in RDG Associates/Jorman Corp. v.
Industrial Comm'n, 63 Utah Adv. Rep. 12
(1987).

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
C.J.S. — 99 CJ.S. Workmen's Compensation §§ 37 to 58.
A.L.R. — Right to maintain direct action
against fellow employee for injury or death

covered by workmen's compensation, 21
A.L.R.3d 845.
Key Numbers. — Workers' Compensation
*» 186.
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sion order confirming and adopting an Admin- Krantz v. Department of Commerce, 856 P.2d
istrative Law Judge's findings and conclusions 369 (Utah Ct. App. 1993).
was faulty when it failed to contain a notice to
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>A~~ Cited m UOA Lorp. v. Industrial Commn
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63-46b-ll.

Default

(1) The presiding officer may enter an order of default against a party if:
(a) a party in an informal adjudicative proceeding fails to participate in
the adjudicative proceeding;
(b) a party to a formal adjudicative proceeding fails to attend or participate in a properly scheduled hearing after receiving proper notice; or
(c) a respondent in a formal adjudicative proceeding fails to file a response under Section 63-46b-6.
(2) An order of default shall include a statement of the grounds for default
and shall be mailed to all parties.
(3) (a) A defaulted party may seek to have the agency set aside the default
order, and any order in the adjudicative proceeding issued subsequent to
the default order, by following the procedures outlined in the Utah Rules
of Civil Procedure.
(b) A motion to set aside a default and any subsequent order shall be
made to the presiding officer.
(c) A defaulted party may seek agency review under Section 63-46b-12,
or reconsideration under Section 63-46b-13, only on the decision of the
presiding officer on the motion to set aside the default.
(4) (a) In an adjudicative proceeding begun by the agency, or in an adjudicative proceeding begun by a party that has other parties besides the
party in default, the presiding officer shall, after issuing the order of
default, conduct any further proceedings necessary to complete the adjudicative proceeding without the participation of the party in default and
shall determine all issues in the adjudicative proceeding, including those
affecting the defaulting party.
(b) In an adjudicative proceeding that has no parties other than the
agency and the party in default, the presiding officer shall, after issuing
the order of default, dismiss the proceeding.
History: C. 1953, 63-46b-ll, enacted by L.
1987, ch. 161, § 267; 1988, ch. 72, § 21.

63-46b-12. Agency review — Procedure.
(1) (a) If a statute or the agency's rules permit parties to any adjudicative
proceeding to seek review of an order by the agency or by a superior
agency, the aggrieved party may file a written request for review within
30 days after the issuance of the order with the person OT entity designated for that purpose by the statute or rule,
(b) The request shall:
(i) be signed by the party seeking review;
(ii) state the grounds for review and the relief requested;
(iii) state the date upon which it was mailed; and
(iv) be sent by mail to the presiding officer and to each party.
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(2) Within 15 days" of the mailing date of the request for review, or within
the time period provided by agency rule, whichever is longer, any party may
file a response with the person designated by statute or rule to receive the
response. One copy of the response shall be sent by mail to each of the parties
and to the presiding officer.
(3) If a statute or the agency's rules require review of an order by the
agency or a superior agency, the agency or superior agency shall review the
order within a reasonable time or within the time required by statute or the
agency's rules.
(4) To assist in review, the agency or superior agency may by order or rule
permit the parties to file briefs or other papers, or to conduct oral argument.
(5) Notice of hearings on review shall be mailed to all parties.
(6) (a) Within a reasonable time after the filing of any response, other
filings, or oral argument, or within the time required by statute or applicable rules, the agency or superior agency shall issue a written order on
review.
(b) The order on review shall be signed by the agency head or by a
person designated by the agency for that purpose and shall be mailed to
each party.
(c) The order on review shall contain:
(i) a designation of the statute or rule permitting or requiring review;
(ii) a statement of the issues reviewed;
(iii) findings of fact as to each of the issues reviewed;
(iv) conclusions of law as to each of the issues reviewed;
(v) the reasons for the disposition;
(vi) whether the decision of the presiding officer or agency is to be
affirmed, reversed, or modified, and whether all or any portion of the
adjudicative proceeding is to be remanded;
(vii) a notice of any right of further administrative reconsideration
or judicial review available to aggrieved parties; and
(viii) the time limits applicable to any appeal or review.
History. C. 1953, 63-46b-12, enacted by L.
1987, ch. 161, § 268; 1988, ch. 72, § 22.
NOTES TO DECISIONS
Findings.

ANALYSIS

Filing.
Findings.
—Sufficiency.
Jurisdiction.
Timeliness.
Cited.
Filing.
Absent a showing of good cause for an extension, the term "filing" as used in this section
requires, as a prerequisite to the agency's taking jurisdiction over a review, actual delivery
of the necessary documents to the agency
within the thirty-day time limit. Maverik
Country Stores, Inc. v. Industrial Comm'n, 221
Utah Adv. Rep. 17 (Ct. App. 1993).

—Sufficiency.
When the facts in a case are undisputed, the
failure to disclose a specific subsidiary finding
is not fatal to the agency's decision. Zupon v.
Industrial Comm'n, 221 Utah Adv. Rep. 37 (Ct.
App. 1993).
Jurisdiction.
Appeals from agency orders subject to further administrative review do not divest the
agency of jurisdiction. Maverik Country
Stores, Inc. v. Industrial Comm'n, 221 Utah
Adv. Rep. 17 (Ct. App. 1993).
Timeliness.
Rule 6(e), U.R.C.P., which adds three days to
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History: R.S. 1933, 42-1-97a, enacted by
L. 1939, ch. 51, § 1; C. 1943, 42-l-97a.
COLLATERAL REFERENCES
C.J.S. — 82 C J.S. Statutes § 92 et seq.
Key Numbers. — Statutes «=» 64(2).

35-1-107. Uninsured Employers' Fund.
(1) There is created an Uninsured Employers' Fund. The fund has the purpose of assisting in the payment of workers' compensation benefits to any
person entitled to them, if that person's employer is individually, jointly, or
severally liable to pay the benefits, but becomes or is insolvent, appoints or
has appointed a receiver, or otherwise does not have sufficient funds, insurance, sureties, or other security to cover workers' compensation liabilities.
This fund succeeds to all monies previously held in the Default Indemnity
Fund. If it becomes necessary to pay benefits, the fund is liable for all obligations of the employer as set forth in Chapters 1 and 2, Title 35, with the
exception of penalties on those obligations.
(2) Funds for the Uninsured Employers' Fund shall be provided under Subsection 59-9-101 (2). The state treasurer is the custodian of the Uninsured
Employers' Fund and the commission shall direct its distribution. Reasonable
costs of administration may be paid from the fund. The commission shall
employ counsel to represent the Uninsured Employers' Fund in all proceedings brought to enforce claims against or on behalf of the fund. Upon the
request of the commission, the attorney general, city attorney, or county attorney of the locality in which any investigation, hearing, or trial under this
title is pending, or in which the employee resides or an employer resides or is
doing business, shall aid in the representation of the fond.
(3) To the extent of the compensation and other benefits paid or payable to
or on behalf of an employee or the employee's dependentsfromthe Uninsured
Employers' Fund, the fond, by subrogation, has all the rights, powers, and
benefits of the employee or the employee's dependents against the employer
failing to make the compensation payments.
(4) The receiver, trustee, liquidator, or statutory successor of an insolvent
employer is bound by settlements of covered claims by the fund. The court
with jurisdiction shall grant all payments made under this section a priority
equal to that to which the claimant would have been entitled in the absence of
this section against the assets of the insolvent employer. The expenses of the
fund in handling claims shall be accorded the same priority as the liquidator's
expenses.
(5) The commission shall periodically file with the receiver, trustee, or liquidator of the insolvent employer or insurance carrier statements of the covered claims paid by the fund and estimates of anticipated claims against the
fund which shall preserve the rights of the fund for claims against the assets
of the insolvent employer.
(6) When any injury or death for which compensation is payablefromthe
Uninsured Employers' Fund has been caused by the wrongful act or neglect of
another person not in the same employment, the fund has the same rights as
allowed under Section 35-1-62.
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(7) The fund, subject to approval of the Workers' Compensation Division of
the Industrial Commission, shall discharge its obligations by adjusting its
own claims or by contracting with an adjusting company, risk management
company, insurance company, or other company that has expertise and capabilities in adjusting and paying workers' compensation claims.
(8) For the purpose of maintaining this fund, the commission, upon rendering a decision with respect to any claim for workers' compensation benefits,
shall impose a penalty against the uninsured employer of 15% of the value of
the total award in connection with the claim, and shall direct that the additional penalty be paid into the Uninsured Employers' Fund. Awards may be
docketed as other awards under this chapter.
(9) The liability of the state, the Industrial Commission, and the state treasurer, with respect to payment of any compensation benefits, expenses, fees,
or disbursement properly chargeable against the fund, is limited to the assets
in the fund, and they are not otherwise in any way liable for the making of
any payment.
(10) The commission may make reasonable rules for the processing and
payment of claims for compensation from the fund.
(11) In the event it becomes necessary for the Uninsured Employers' Fund
to pay benefits under this section to any employee of an insolvent self-insured
employer, the Uninsured Employers' Fund may assess all other self-insured
employers amounts necessary to pay (a) the obligations of the fund subsequent to an insolvency, (b) the expenses of handling covered claims subsequent to an insolvency, (c) the cost of examinations under Subsection (12), and
(d) other expenses authorized by this section. The assessments of each selfinsured employer shall be in the proportion that the manual premium of the
self-insured employer for the preceding calendar year bears to the manual
premium of all self-insured employers for the preceding calendar year. Each
self-insured employer shall be notified of his assessment not later than 30
days before it is due. No self-insured employer may be assessed in any year an
amount greater than 2% of that self-insured employer's manual premium for
the preceding calendar year. If the maximum assessment does not provide in
any one year an amount sufficient to make all necessary payments from the
fund for one or more insolvent self-insured employers, the unpaid portion
shall be paid as soon as funds become available. All self-insured employers are
liable under this section for a period not to exceed three years after the selfinsured employer's voluntary or involuntary termination of self-insurance
privileges within this state. This subsection does not apply to claims made
against an insolvent self-insured employer if the insolvency occurred prior to
July 1, 1986.
(12) It is the duty of all self-insured employers to notify the industrial
commission of any information indicating that any self-insured employer may
be insolvent or in a financial condition hazardous to its employees or the
public. Upon receipt of that notification and with good cause appearing, the
industrial commission may order an examination of that self-insured employer. The cost of the examination shall be assessed against all self-insured
employers as provided in Subsection (11). The results of the examination shall
be kept confidential.
(13) In any claim against an employer by the Uninsured Employers' Fund,
or by or on behalf of the employee to whom or to whose dependents compensation and other benefits are paid or payable from the fund, the burden of proof
280

WORKERS' COMPENSATION

35-1-107

is on the employer or other party in interest objecting to the claim. The claim
is presumed to be valid up to the full amount of workers' compensation benefits claimed by the employee or his dependents. This subsection applies
whether the claim is filed in court or in an adjudicative proceeding under the
authority of the commission.
(14) A partner in a partnership or an owner of a sole proprietorship may not
recover compensation or other benefits from the Uninsured Employers' Fund
if:

(a) the person is not included as an employee under Subsection 35-1-43
(3) (a); or
(b) the person is included as an employee under Subsection 35-1-43 (3)
(a), but his employer fails to insure or otherwise provide adequate payment of direct compensation, which failure is attributable to an act or
omission over which the person had or shared control or responsibility.
(15) For purposes of Subsection (14) (b):
(a) a partner of a partnership and an owner of a sole proprietorship are
presumed to have had or shared control or responsibility for any failure to
insure or otherwise provide adequate payment of direct compensation, the
burden of proof being on any person seeking to establish the contrary; and
(b) evidence affirmatively establishing that a partner of a partnership
or an owner of a sole proprietorship had or shared control or responsibility
for any failure to insure or otherwise provide adequate payment of direct
compensation may only be overcome by clear and convincing evidence to
the contrary.
(16) A director or officer of a corporation may not recover compensation or
other benefitsfromthe Uninsured Employers' Fund if the director or officer is
excluded from coverage under Subsection 35-1-43 (3) (b).
(17) Any additional administrative burden imposed by amendments to Subsection 35-1-42 (5) during the 1988 general session of the Legislature may be
funded out of the Uninsured Employers' Fund, up to a maximum of $16,000.
History: C. 1953, 35-1-107, enacted by L.
1984, ch. 77, § 1; 1986, ch. 211, § 12; 1987,
ch. 2, § 35; 1987, ch. 126, § 4; 1988, ch. 109,
* 3.
Amendment Notes. — The 1986 amendment, effective July 1, 1986, in Subsection (1)
substituted "Uninsured Employers' Fund" for
"Default Indemnity Fund" wherever it appears; inserted "of the claimant who is found to
be individually, jointly, or severally liable" before "becomes" and inserted "or is" after "becomes" in the first sentence, inserted the second sentence, added "with the exception of penalties on those obligations" at the end of the
last sentence, and made minor word changes;
in Subsection (2) added "and 31A-3-20K2)" at
the end of the first sentence, substituted "commission ' for "attorney general", substituted
employ counsel" for "appoint a member of his
staff', added "and upon the request of the commissicn the attorney general, city attorney, or
county attorney of the locality in which any
investigation, hearing, or trial under the provisions of this title is pending, or in which the

employee resides or an employer resides or is
doing business, shall aid in the representation
of the fund," at the end of the fourth sentence,
and made stylistic changes; made stylistic
changes in Subsections (3), (4), (7), and (10); in
the first sentence of Subsection (8) deleted
"from the Default Indemnity Fund" following
claim," substituted "benefits" for "compensation" following "for", inserted "uninsured" before "employer" and "value of the" before
"total", deleted "made" following "award", inserted "in connection with" following "in", and
inserted "Uninsured Employers'" before
"Fund", and added Subsections (11) and (12).
The 1987 amendment, by Chapter 2, effective February 6, 1987, in Subsection (2) substituted "Subsections 35-l-68(2)(a) and 59-9101(2)" for "Subsections 35-l-68(2)(a) and
31A-3-201".
The 1987 amendment, by Chapter 208, effective July 1,1987, in Subsection (2), in the first
sentence substituted "under Subsection
31A-3-20K2)" for "pursuant to Subsections
35-l-68-(2)(a) and 31A-3-20K2)"
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The section was set out in 1987 as reconciled
by the Office of Legislative Research and General Counsel
The 1988 amendment, effective April 25,
1988, in Subsection (1), divided the former first
sentence into the present first two sentences
and, in the second sentence, substituted T h e
fund has the purpose of assisting m the payment of workers' compensation benefits to any
person entitled to them, if that person's employer is individually, jointly, or severally liable to pay the benefits, but" for "for the purpose
of paying and assuring, to persons entitled to
workers' compensation benefits when every
employer of the claimant who is found to be

individually, jointly, or severally liable" and
deleted "under this chapter" at the end; m Subsection (2), divided the former fourth sentence
into the present last two sentences and deleted
"the provisions of preceding "this title" m the
last sentence; substituted "the employees'" for
"their" twice in Subsection (3), "with jurisdiction" for "having jurisdiction" in the second
sentence m Subsection (4) and "workers' compensation benefits" for "benefits under this
chapter" in the first sentence of Subsection (8);
and added Subsections (13) through (17).
Retrospective Operation. — Laws 1987,
ch. 2, § 331 provides: "This act has retrospective operation to January 1, 1987."

NOTES TO DECISIONS
Cited in Carlucci v. Utah State Indus.
Comm'n & Default Indemn. Fund, 725 P.2d

1335 (Utah 1986); Jacobsen v. Industrial
Comm'n, 738 P.2d 658 (Utah Ct. App. 1987).
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